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One of the most remarkable outcomes of the American Civil
Rights movement of the twentieth century was the highly prominent
role played by the federal judiciary. The federal judiciary, which
stands as the ultimate symbol of American power, values, justice, and
prestige, was tasked with the privilege of unifying the disjointed
1
groups of people who comprised the United States. Through the
desegregation cases, the federal judiciary ushered in the use of the
civil rights injunction in the American legal system. In courts of equity, an injunction is a remedy that requires a party to a case to cease or
perform a specific act, or face criminal or civil penalties for failing to
2
3
cooperate. Through the highly lauded Brown v. Board of Education
(“Brown I”) case and its progeny, the federal courts used such equitable principles as the guide to shape school desegregation decrees.
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See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 21 (1981) (“The injunctive process concentrates power
in judges because they can decide without a jury whether to grant relief, and they possess
contempt powers to enforce their orders. This allows them to act by whatever legal means
are necessary.”).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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With these developments to the federal bench, the Due Process
4
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment became the primary instrument the federal judiciary used to reform and reshape American society.
Brown I is one of the most highly celebrated opinions in American
jurisprudence. We recognize today the sixtieth anniversary of the decision that heralded the promise of equality in educational opportunities that would serve to dismantle the system of oppression and legally sanctioned apartheid in this country. It was believed that
through the holding, which guaranteed access to high quality education to all on equal terms, free of the stigma of racial identification,
that the harms done to the hearts and minds of children subjected to
such systems would not only secure their position in American society, but would also elevate all Americans.
However, in spite of the celebration of the power of the federal
judiciary to attempt to advance the charge of equality among all men
guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence, the reality of the
5
impact of the desegregation cases is starkly grim. Sixty years after
striking down the legal precedent of racially separate but equal facilities and accommodations, American public schools have remained
racially polarized and woefully unequal.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (“Brown II”), which was intended to be a remedial counterpart to
Brown I, allowed the defendant school districts, who were the identified wrongdoers, the unique authority to provide their own solutions
6
to the issue of school desegregation. Rather than ordering a decree
of a national standard of school integration, the Court ordered local
school boards to devise the remedies that would redress the harms
inflicted upon the plaintiffs. “School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these [school de7
segregation] problems . . . .” The Supreme Court also charged lower
4
5

6

7

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating that no State shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”)
The terms “integration” and “desegregation” will be used interchangeably throughout
this Article. For a more thorough discussion on the legal differences and social
implications of the two terms, see generally Erica Frankenberg, School Segregation,
Desegregation, and Integration: What Do These Terms Mean in a Post-Parents Involved in
Community Schools, Racially Transitioning Society?, 6 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 533 (2007).
See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1403 (1998) (discussing that when civil rights litigants
must depend on the government actor wrongdoers for relief, the government becomes
the primary enforcement vehicle for civil rights, “[a]nd yet, for a variety of reasons, the
government has failed to play a strong role as an enforcement agency” for civil rights).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).

Feb. 2015]

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT

627

federal district courts with the responsibility to determine whether
the defendants fulfilled their duties toward integration based on local
community standards: “[C]ourts will have to consider whether the
action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of
the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to
local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the
courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judi8
cial appraisal.”
The federal judiciary experienced great difficulty with the enforcement of desegregation orders. Therefore, by 1991, the Supreme
Court determined that school desegregation lawsuits were not to be
maintained by lower courts indefinitely. As a consequence of the Supreme Court’s urgings to eliminate desegregation orders as soon as
possible, federal district courts have declared many districts “unitary”
and have returned the schools to local control. A study conducted of
federal district court opinions and the appeals of those decisions
found that in the decade from 1992 to 2002 all but one request to the
9
court for unitary status was granted.
Concurrent with school districts’ attempts to integrate schools
through judicial orders, many districts, recognizing the value of students attending desegregated schools, chose to pursue voluntary in10
tegration methods. However, in 2007, the Supreme Court in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 struck down
voluntary integration plans in effect by Seattle, Washington and Jef11
ferson County, Kentucky public schools. While districts under court
order to desegregate were not directly affected by this legal ruling,
several districts ceased their voluntary integration plans as a result.
The question remains: What are the academic consequences to children as a result of the Supreme Court’s further insistence on the abolition of desegregation efforts?
Although there have been numerous studies conducted to determine the resegregation levels of districts that have been declared uni-

8
9

10
11

Id.
See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District
Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1623 (2003) (examining and analyzing all federal
district court opinions concerning school desegregation from June 1, 1992 to June 1,
2002); id. at 1633 (noting a case in which a school district in Pennsylvania was declared
only partially unitary, despite its request for full unitary status).
See, e.g., FREDERICK M. WIRT, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE NORTH: THE CHALLENGE
AND THE EXPERIENCE 116-28 (1967) (describing various voluntary desegregation efforts).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 747–748 (2007).
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tary, 12 there exists a paucity of data that considers the academic
achievement of students who attend schools in these “unitary” districts. This Article considers the high school graduation rates among
students in school districts in which federal courts have decided unitary status cases since 2007.
Part I considers the impact of the Parents Involved case on voluntary efforts toward school integration. Part II considers how Brown I
and its progeny evolved into the jurisprudence followed by the modern judiciary. Parts III and IV consider all of the cases that have been
before the federal bench since 2007 with motions for unitary status
consideration, and the district wide graduation rates of students in
those districts. Part V concludes with outcomes that federal judges
should consider when making unitary status determinations, and the
educational and societal impacts of their decisions.
I.

PARENTS MAY BE INVOLVED, BUT SCHOOL DISTRICTS MAY NOT
VOLUNTARILY BE INVOLVED
MR. RANKIN [on behalf of the United States]: And the whole concept
of constitutional law is that those rights that are defined and set out in
the Constitution are not to be subject to the political form which changes
from time to time, but are to be preserved under the holdings of this
Court over many, many years by the orders of this Court granting the re13
lief prayed for.

School desegregation and its validity, while debated vociferously
with regard to our modern-day school configurations, has been the
14
subject of judicial and legislative scrutiny for over a century. The
12

13

14

See e.g., Jennifer B. Ayscue et al., Segregation Again: North Carolina’s Transition from Leading
Desegregation Then to Accepting Segregation Now, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REPORT NO. 6
(2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/segregation-again-north-carolina2019s-transition-from-leadingdesegregation-then-to-accepting-segregation-now/Ayscue-Woodward-Segregation-Again2014.pdf (investigating trends in school segregation in North Carolina over the past two
decades).
Transcript of Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), quoted in BROWN V.
BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 244 (Leon
Friedman ed., 2004).
Between 1850 and 1883, several high courts in northern states addressed the validity of
school segregation against state and federal constitutional attack. See, e.g., Ward v. Flood,
48 Cal. 36, 37 (1874) (holding that black children may be excluded from schools
established for white children, provided that a separate school of equal facilities has been
established for black children); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 356–57 (1874) (holding that a
classification of students based on race is constitutional as long as it does not exclude a
particular race from equal school advantages); Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198,
198 (5 Cush. 1849) (holding that the general school committee of Boston had the power
to make provision for the instruction of colored children in separate schools); State ex rel.
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storied history behind the attempts at racial integration of children in
schools in the United States is one that tells the tale of the interplay
between legislative, social, and judicial confluences, in a country
where ideological agreement is rarely found among the three
15
branches. The result of the convergence has led to periods of time

15

Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 348 (1872) (holding that the Nevada Constitution
requires that all resident children between the ages of six and eighteen, regardless of
race, be granted admission to Nevada public schools, but that it is entirely within the
power of the school trustees “to send all blacks to one school, and all whites to
another . . . .”); People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 451 (1883) (holding that
where the right to secure equal educational advantages is afforded by the school
authorities, an individual “cannot justly claim that his educational privileges have been
abridged” merely because he does not receive his education where he most desires to
receive it); State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 202 (1871) (holding that an
Act authorizing separate-but-equal public schools for black schoolchildren did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor did the Act contravene the Ohio Constitution). Four courts invalidated
segregation under state law. See Chase v. Stephenson, 71 Ill. 383, 385 (1874) (holding
that all children within a school district, regardless of race or color, shall have the equal
right to participate in the benefits of the public schools and school directors have no
power to discriminate between students on account of their color, race, or social
position); Clark v. Bd. of Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 267 (1868) (holding that the state
constitutional provision providing “for the education of all the youths of the State”
through a system of common schools precludes the school board from denying admission
to an otherwise eligible student on the basis of race and precludes the board from
compelling a black student to attend a separate school for black children); Bd. of Educ. v.
Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1, 18 (1881) (holding that the ultimate question of whether states have
the power to impose school segregation can only be decided by the Supreme Court and
that, even if such power exists, the Kansas legislature has not clearly conferred it to the
state school boards); People ex rel. Workman v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 18 Mich. 400,
409–10 (1869) (holding that a state act providing that “[a]ll residents of any district shall
have an equal right to attend any school therein” is applicable to the city of Detroit and
prohibits the school board from excluding a resident from any of its schools on account
of color). In 1871, the District of Columbia Committee of the United States Senate
proposed a bill to eliminate racial segregation in public schools within the District of
Columbia. Proponents of the bill insisted that this was required by the equality principle
of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the opponents of the bill did not argue the
alternative, the bill never passed to a vote before the Senate. This resulted in Congress’
continued funding of a segregated school system. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d. Sess.
1054 (1871); ROBERT HARRISON, WASHINGTON DURING CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION:
RACE AND RADICALISM 138–40 (2011) (describing the controversial impact of Senator
Charles Sumner’s insistence on school integration in Congress and indicating, most
notably, that despite Congressional inaction, Senator Sumner introduced a school
integration bill every year from 1871 until his death in 1874).
Compare Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982) (invalidating a
statute under the Equal Protection Clause, enacted by a majority of the state of
Washington’s citizens, that prohibited racially integrative busing as a means to integrate
schools), with Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2005) (“Brown was not a revolutionary decision.
Rather, it is the definitive example that the interest of blacks in achieving racial justice is
accommodated only when and for so long as policymakers find that the interest of blacks
converges with the political and economic interests of whites.”).
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where racial integration was sought, and periods where such an ideal
16
has been considered veritably impossible. Yet, sixty years after the
17
Supreme Court unanimously decided the seminal case of the twentieth century, decrying the adverse impact of racially separate schools
18
on the future health of our nation, American public schools remain
19
grossly unequal and woefully separate. In spite of ongoing public
20
recognition of the significance of the decision to the judiciary, legis16

17

18

19

20

Compare Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439–40 (1968) (holding that racially
segregated schools within a school system do not necessarily violate the Constitution, but
that a school district’s “freedom of choice” plan was not enough in itself to achieve
desegregation), with Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1964) (holding that
the closure of schools to avoid desegregation was in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 696 (1976) (discussing the roles of Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Justice Felix Frankfurter in assuring a unanimous result);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY 95 (1983) (“If anyone worked for a unified Court to strike down segregation,
it was Frankfurter . . . . [He] cooperated closely with the new Chief [Justice Earl Warren]
in securing Court unanimity.”). See also Brad Snyder & John Q. Barrett, Rehnquist’s
Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk’s 1955 Thoughts on Justice Jackson and Brown, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 631, 632 (2012) (discussing William Rehnquist’s advice to Justice Jackson during the
1952 Brown oral arguments, that Plessy v. Ferguson should be affirmed) (citing
Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to Justice Robert H. Jackson, A Random
Thought on the Segregation Cases (1952), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/sources_document7.html).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms.”).
Gary Orfield, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & John Kucsera, Sorting Out Deepening Confusion on
Segregation Trends, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 1, 7 (2014), available at
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/sorting-out-deepening-confusion-on-segregation-trends/Segregation-TrendsDispute-CRP-Researchers.pdf (“When it comes to segregation measures, known as the
exposure and isolation indices . . . black students [since 1989 have] increasingly attended
schools with disproportionally low shares of whites . . . .”). But see Sean Reardon & Ann
Owens, 60 Years After Brown: Trends and Consequences of School Segregation 40 ANN. REV. SOC.
199, 213 (2014), available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurevsoc-071913-043152 (concluding that the changes in school segregation patterns in the last
few decades are not as dramatic as social scientists may purport).
To mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision, the U.S. Departments of Justice
and Education, several law schools, and other social, civic, and government organizations
sponsored commemorative activities to honor the impact of the decision on the
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lature, and the social mores of our country, the promise that Brown I
held and the harms that the decision sought to remedy—that were
inflicted upon the courageous plaintiffs and the classes represent21
22
ed— have yet to be fully realized in practice.
After over half a century of attempting to implement Brown I and
find common ground among those who advocate integration and
those who reject judicially ordered integration, all while at least os23
tensibly honoring Brown I’s legacy, in 2007 the Supreme Court is-

21

22

23

American way of life. The following is a short sampling of such events: April 2, 2004,
Virginia Historical Society, Before and After Brown in Virginia; April 8-May 2, 2004,
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Judge Damon Keith’s Marching Toward
Justice Exhibit on Brown v. Board of Education (later to be on display at Howard University
School of Law from May 17, 2004 through the summer); April 13, 2004, UMBC
Department of American Studies, panel presentation on “Reflections on the Brown
Decision: African American Experience and Schooling in Baltimore County”; April 14,
2004, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, a panel discussion: “Brown v. Board of
Education: Yesterday and Today”; April 15 & 16, 2004, Georgetown University Law
Center, Bolling v. Sharpe at 50: Desegregation in the District of Columbia: Past, Present,
and Future; May 10, 2004, “Unfinished Business: Keeping the Promise of Brown v. Board
of Education,” sponsored by Institute for Educational Leadership, The Century
Foundation, and The Center for American Progress; May 13, 2004, Library of Congress
Exhibit on Brown v. Board of Education; May 13, 2004, Department of Justice, Brown v.
Board of Education 50th Anniversary Commemoration; May 13–14, 2004, University of Kansas,
Conference on Fifty Years after Brown v. Board of Education: Social Psychological Research
Applied to the Problems of Racism and Discrimination. Outside Events, BROWN@50: FUL
FILLING THE PROMISE, http://www.brownat50.org/brownevents/
BrownEventsOthers.htm.
See ROBERT CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF EQUAL
RIGHTS 132 (2005) (indicating the rights of the victorious Brown litigants were never truly
realized because none of the original plaintiffs in the South Carolina, Kansas, or Virginia
cases ever attended an unsegregated school, which demonstrates that the educational
opportunities Brown I required and the speediness Brown II insisted upon were never
enforced, even in the instances of the nationally highlighted plaintiffs).
Even as the nation heralded the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown I decision, rates of
integration were declining. In 1970, black students typically attended schools where
enrollment was 32% white. By 2010, black students typically attended schools that were
only 29% white. Gary Orfield, John Kucsera & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, E Pluribus . . .
Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 22 fig. 3,
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus . . . separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-more
students/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf (last updated Oct. 18, 2012).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 842 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And it was Brown . . . that affected so deeply not only Americans
but the world.”); Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379 (W.D.
Ky. 2000) (“Brown and its progeny established a moral imperative to eradicate racial
injustice in the public schools.”). See also KLUGER, supra note 17, at x (arguing that no
other Supreme Court opinion has “affected more directly the minds, hearts, and daily
lives of so many Americans”). See also Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame: Brown as
Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 940 (2008) (“Presently invoked to support every popular
decision on racial inequality, the 1954 school segregation cases no longer stand for any
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sued its first school desegregation case in over a decade. 24 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, and its companion case Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education (hereinafter
25
Parents Involved), addressed the extent to which a school district can
use race to desegregate. The issues in this case starkly divided the
Court, whereby five opinions were rendered, none garnering a major26
ity. In this highly fractured decision, the Court struck down racebased student assignments used by districts attempting to voluntarily
27
The Court’s ruling maintained that the Fourintegrate schools.
teenth Amendment places different standards on the use of racebased student assignments in schools that are under court order to
desegregate, as opposed to those that choose to voluntarily integrate
28
students and are not subject to mandatory desegregation plans.

24

25
26

27

28

contested proposition or are identified in any distinctive way with the civil rights
movement. Brown, like Paris Hilton, is now famous largely for being famous.”).
See Graber, supra note 23, at 939 (indicating that, prior to 2007, the Rehnquist and
Roberts Supreme Courts rarely cited Brown I or Brown II for any significant legal
proposition, and almost never did so after George W. Bush took office in 2001).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701.
Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion garnered agreement by Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent obtained the
consent of Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter. Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, has
been considered the controlling opinion in this case. See id.
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this instance, there were previous
cases in which lower courts were required to consider the constitutionality of voluntary
integration plans that considered race. See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch.
Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 746–53 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the reduction of racial isolation
resulting from de facto segregation can be a compelling state interest in denying a
requested preliminary injunction directing the school district to allow a white student to
transfer from a city school district to a suburban school district in spite of a stateadministered interdistrict transfer program); Tuttle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d
698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the weighted admissions policy for a public,
alternative school, which considered applicants’ races and ethnicities, was not narrowly
tailored to achieve an allegedly compelling interest in attaining diversity); Hunter ex rel.
Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
consideration of race or ethnicity in the admissions process at an elementary school did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Ho v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 865
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that public schools that denied enrollment to students of
Chinese descent through the use of racial classification and a quota system set forth in a
1983 consent desegregation decree must demonstrate at trial that: (1) the “vestiges” of
racism sufficiently remain to justify the ethnically-based limitations in the consent decree;
and (2) the limitations are narrowly tailored to remove such vestiges); Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 792 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that an admissions policy that makes
race a determining factor in the admission of a subset of each year’s incoming classes was
not justified either on the basis of asserted governmental interest in diversity, or as means
of redressing vestiges of past discrimination).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 702–03 (“Although remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test, that interest is not
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Reviewing the student assignment plans under strict scrutiny, the
Parents Involved Court maintained that the school districts had to
demonstrate that the use of racial classifications in their student assignment plans were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The Court held that school districts’ stated goal
of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination could not
serve as a compelling interest to justify their use of race-based classifications when making student assignments and student transfer determinations. The Court distinguished that remedying the effects of
past intentional discrimination is a compelling interest for districts
under court order to desegregate, but such interests were impermissible under strict scrutiny for districts that were not required by law to
29
desegregate. Further, the Justices held that the districts’ goal of fostering increased educational and broader socialization benefits
through racially diverse learning environments that were linked to
racial demographics and not to any identified pedagogical goal was
30
impermissible, and thereby unconstitutional. The Court was clear
to indicate that the districts’ reliance on the Court’s prior ruling of a
31
compelling interest in diversity in higher education could not justify
the kindergarten through twelfth grade school districts’ use of race
32
for student assignments under the Equal Protection Clause.

29
30
31

32

involved here because the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to
court-ordered desegregation, and the desegregation decree to which the Jefferson
County schools were previously subject has been dissolved.”) (citation omitted).
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 725–27.
See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (“When race-based action is
necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement
is also satisfied.”).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007) (“The
point of the narrow tailoring analysis in which the Grutter Court engaged was to ensure
that the use of racial classifications was indeed part of a broader assessment of diversity,
and not simply an effort to achieve racial balance, which the Court explained would be
patently unconstitutional.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Id. at 724 (“In
upholding the admissions plan in Grutter, though, this Court relied upon considerations
unique to institutions of higher education . . . ”). However, the Court in Brown I, relying
on the Supreme Court’s prior desegregation decisions in higher education, did not
distinguish the benefits of desegregation for students in institutions of higher education
from those for students in elementary and high schools. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 491–92 (1954), (“In more recent cases [heard by this Court], all on the graduate
school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were
denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications.”).
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If a school district is obviously segregated, but a judge does not say
33
it is segregated, is it segregated? In this decision, the Court posited
the distinction between the responsibilities of school districts that are
required to desegregate by judicial order and the rights of those that
choose to do so voluntarily due to a finding that students benefit
34
from being educated in a diverse educational setting. There was
great disagreement among the Justices as to whether Seattle schools
35
36
operated de jure segregated schools. Justice Roberts maintained
that Seattle had never legally operated segregated schools, nor was it
ever subjected to court-ordered desegregation; therefore, all of its de37
segregation efforts were strictly voluntary. Alternatively, the dissent
33

34

35

36

37

A variation of the colloquial philosophical thought experiment, “If a tree falls in a forest
and no one is around to hear it fall, does it make a sound?” that raises questions
regarding observation and acknowledgment of reality.
Since Brown I was decided, courts have responded to the issue of whether the Brown
mandates apply solely to districts that segregate by order of the law, de jure segregation,
or whether districts in which social norms perpetuate segregation, de facto segregation,
are also subject to Brown. Parents Involved was the first time, however, that the Supreme
Court, in evaluating the constitutionality of race-based desegregation policies, noted a
distinction between districts obligated to desegregate by court order and districts that
choose to voluntarily desegregate. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 702–03. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Bd. of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 192–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff’d, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961)
(“I see no basis to draw a distinction, legal or moral, between segregation established by
the formality of a dual system of education, as in Brown, and that created by
gerrymandering of school district lines and transferring of white children as in the instant
case. The result is the same in each case: the conduct of responsible school officials has
operated to deny to Negro children the opportunities for a full and meaningful
educational experience guaranteed to them by the 14th Amendment. . . . Having created
a segregated school, the Constitution imposed upon the Board the duty to end
segregation, in good faith, and with all deliberate speed.”) (internal citations omitted).
For purposes of this Article, districts that have been declared unitary yet still have
segregated schools are considered to be de facto segregated because the distinction of
being declared unitary presumes that the discriminatory intent to segregate students has
been removed “root and branch” in the district. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
437–38 (1968). See also, Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18
(1971) (noting de facto segregation is present “where racial imbalance exists in the
schools but with no showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action of state
authorities”); Parent Ass’n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 712–13
(2d Cir. 1979) (affirming a district court’s finding that, what the panel labeled as de facto
segregation of the school, “resulted from population changes” in the surrounding
neighborhoods).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because this Court has
authorized and required race-based remedial measures to address de jure segregation, it is
important to define segregation clearly and to distinguish it from racial imbalance. In
the context of public schooling, segregation is the deliberate operation of a school system
to ‘carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of
race.’. . . Racial imbalance is the failure of a school district’s individual schools to match
or approximate the demographic makeup of the student population at large.”) (citation
omitted).
Id. at 712 (plurality opinion).
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argued that in 1966 plaintiffs in Seattle filed a federal lawsuit claiming unconstitutional segregation on the part of the Seattle School
38
Board. The complaint alleged that the school board created a segregated school system by drawing boundary lines and enforcing
school attendance policies that created and maintained predominately separate white and black schools. The complaint also charged that
39
The parties in the
the board discriminated in assigning teachers.
case settled after the school district pledged to undertake a desegregation plan that included race-based transfers and mandatory student
40
busing. Although Jefferson County had been found to maintain a
41
segregated school system, after over 25 years, the district was declared unitary in 2000 and relieved of its duty to operate under a de42
segregation order.
In spite of the lack of clarity by all of the Parents Involved Justices as
to whether desegregative remedies should be enforceable only in de
jure segregated districts solely as opposed to both de jure and de fac43
to segregated schools, Brown I appears to settle the issue. The Warren Court in Brown I was very explicit in its holding that:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of in44
feriority affects the motivation of a child to learn.

Although the Warren Court indicated that the harms imposed on
students in segregated school environments were greater when segregation had the authority of the law behind it, the Warren Court
never indicated that the harms that resulted from receiving education in segregated schools were exclusively inflicted upon children
attending schools that were lawfully segregated. This lack of distinction between de jure and de facto segregation by the Brown I Court
38
39
40
41
42
43

44

Id. at 808 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 809 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 806–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 931 (6th Cir. 1973).
See Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 382 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973) (holding that, absent laws
requiring school segregation, plaintiffs must prove intentional segregative acts affecting a
substantial part of the school system); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992) (“Where
resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not have
constitutional implications.”). This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court cases
that maintain when facially neutral laws have a discriminatory impact, proof of
discriminatory purpose is necessary to show an equal protection violation. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that discriminatory impact devoid of
discriminatory intent is insufficient to prove a racial classification).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 482, 494 (1954) (emphasis added).
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and the harms that are inflicted upon students who attend segregated
schools should have been significant to the Parents Involved Court that
45
relied heavily upon Brown I to base its decision. Further, while Justice Breyer in his dissent acknowledged the legal distinction between
de jure and de facto segregation, he aptly points out that “[the] distinction concerns what the Constitution requires school boards to do,
46
not what it permits them to do.”
47
The impact of this distinction is great in that Parents Involved
48
forecloses districts that have been declared unitary or those that
recognize the benefits of diversity in their schools from engaging in
racially-based student assignments. For de facto systems, the controlling Parents Involved opinion interpreted the Equal Protection Clause
as prohibiting the use of overt racial classifications in voluntary de49
segregation programs. In effect, Parents Involved maintains that if a
school district identifies harms to students that Brown I found uncon50
51
stitutional, it may not engage in the self-correction remedies that
45

46
47

48

49

50

51

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 705 (2007)
(indicating that it was not the inequality of facilities that Brown found unconstitutional
but the fact of legally separating children based on race).
Id. at 844 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
But see James Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131,
132–33 (2007) (positing that the Parents Involved decision will not change much in the
landscape of school desegregation).
Unitary status denotes the end of school desegregation litigation and the case is usually
dismissed. Once a school district is declared unitary, it is assumed that schools in the
district have removed the stigma of being “black” or “white” schools. See Green v. Cnty.
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (“The Board must be required to formulate a new plan
and . . . fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a
‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 246 (1991) (“Courts have used . . . ‘unitary’ to describe a school system which
has been brought into compliance with the command of the Consitution.”). However,
the existence of racially homogeneous schools within school systems will not necessarily
bar a school district from being declared unitary. See Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1971); Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 702 F.2d 1221,
1226 (5th Cir. 1983) (“It is axiomatic that the existence of a few racially homogeneous
schools within a school system is not per se offensive to the Constitution.”).
Citing that the districts in this case were not judicially mandated to comply with a
desegregation order, the Court maintained that “[t]he justification for race conscious
remedies . . . is therefore not applicable here.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 737.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494, 494 (1954) (“We must look instead to the effect
of segregation itself on public education. . . . To separate [students] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”).
But see Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (“School authorities are traditionally charged with broad
power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for
example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for
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would be judicially allowable if a judge were to find such harms present. While the Parents Involved Court did little to upend the equal
protection precedents that uphold the use of race-conscious policies
for school districts judicially ordered to follow desegregation decrees,
the Court did emphasize that “[e]ven in the context of mandatory
desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not re52
quired . . . .”
In maintaining differing standards for de jure and de facto segregated districts for ensuring schoolwide diversity, the Parents Involved
Court made an ideological reversal from several decades of jurisprudence that extended substantial deference to local school board authority, particularly as it relates to setting school desegregation policy
53
issues for districts under court mandate to desegregate. The Roberts opinion indicates “[s]uch deference [toward local authorities] ‘is
54
fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence.’”
55
Citing Richmond v. Croson, the Court stated that “[t]he history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no

52
53

54
55

the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation,
however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court.”); Parent Ass’n of
Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir. 1979) (“It is
permissible, accordingly, for local officials to attempt voluntarily to correct or combat
such an imbalance at a slower pace than would be satisfactory for a school or district
under a court order to dismantle a dual system[.]”(internal citation omitted)).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732 (2007).
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 138 (1995) (“Usurpation of the traditionally
local control over education not only takes the judiciary beyond its proper sphere, it also
deprives the States and their elected officials of their constitutional powers. At some
point, we must recognize that the judiciary is not omniscient, and that all problems do
not require a remedy of constitutional proportions.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
741–42 (1974) (“No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential
both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to
quality of the educational process.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 49–50 (1973) (lauding local control for “the opportunity it offers for participation in
the decisionmaking process that determines how . . . local tax dollars will be spent. Each
locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational
excellence.”); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public
education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.”);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (“Full implementation of these
constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems. School
authorities have the primary responsibility for . . . solving these problems; courts will have
to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith
implementation of the governing constitutional principles.”).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 744 (citation omitted).
488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989).
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place in equal protection analysis.” 56 However, desegregation precedent has historically relied on the assumption that return to local
control—a return to the authority of local decision makers who can
best set policy for districts—is one of the main reasons to declare a
district as unitary as fast as possible.
In maintaining distinctions in school-level segregation, the Roberts opinion rejects the “motives test” applied by Justice Breyer in his
57
dissent of the opinion. Justice Breyer indicated that it was critical to
look at the context in which school districts were choosing to use race
as part of their admission criteria. “If one examines the context more
specifically, one finds that the districts’ plans reflect efforts to overcome a history of segregation, embody the results of broad experience and community consultation, seek to expand student choice
while reducing the need for mandatory busing, and use raceconscious criteria in highly limited ways that diminish the use of race
58
compared to preceding integration efforts.” Citing various precedents, the Parents Involved majority maintains that their purpose in rejecting the motives test is due to the judiciary’s inability “to distin59
guish good from harmful governmental uses of racial criteria.”
Yet, this outright rejection of the motives of the local school authorities in this instance is in direct contradiction to desegregation
jurisprudence that urges lower courts to consider the “good faith efforts” of local school authorities when making unitary status determinations. The Supreme Court has granted vast discretion to federal
district courts to determine the good faith of school authorities when
determining the adequacy of their compliance with desegregation
orders, any ongoing responsibilities the district may have to address
educational inequities, and school actions that have caused segrega60
tion. District courts often rely on the same factors that were pre56

57

58
59
60

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 744–45. But see Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative
Action, Integration & Immigration Rights & Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary
(BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (2014) (using the Fourteenth Amendment to analyze the
validity of whether voters may choose to amend the state constitution to prohibit the
consideration of racial preferences with respect to school admissions, the majority held,
“courts may not disempower the voters from choosing what path to follow.”).
Justice Roberts’ opinion refers to Justice Breyer’s discussion of “context matters” as a
“motives test,” although Justice Breyer does not refer to it as such. See Parents Involved,
551 U.S. at 741–42, 835.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 742 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (“In considering whether the
vestiges of de jure segregation had been eliminated as far as practicable, the District Court
should look not only at student assignments, but to ‘every facet of school
operations . . . .’”); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–90, 495 (1992) (“Just as a court has
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sented in this instance—the experience of the school authorities and
the reliance on community consultants—when making determinations on the legitimacy of court ordered desegregation plans. It appears to be incongruent that the Parents Involved Court would reject
the motives of local officials who are voluntarily enforcing integration
61
plans, yet rely on the motives and good faith of these same local officials, even if vestiges of segregation persist in those districts, when
determining if they have complied with desegregation decrees.
In the instant case, seven years prior to PICS the Western Kentucky District Court relied on the good faith of the Jefferson School
District to release the district from its desegregation court order and
grant it unitary status, even in light of a finding of an Equal Protection violation in its student assignment plan that barred assigning African-American students to a magnet school in the interest of maintaining diversity. Moreover, the district was granted unitary status
against the desire of the school district that argued that the latent
demographic imbalances in the school system were vestiges of de jure
62
segregation. Yet, the Parents Involved Court rejected the motives of
the Jefferson School Board when it made the determination that increased diversity was not a compelling interest sufficient to justify using race to make student assignments, simply because they were no
63
longer under court order to desegregate.
II. HOW DO WE GET TO “UNITARY STATUS?”
JUSTICE JACKSON: “[P]rivate litigation will result in every school district in order to get effective enforcement . . . . But the judicial enforcement remedy means just that, does it not, lawsuit after lawsuit? . . . What

61

62

63

the obligation at the outset of a desegregation decree to structure a plan so that all
available resources of the court are directed to comprehensive supervision of its decree,
so too must a court provide an orderly means for withdrawing from control when it is
shown that the school district has attained the requisite degree of compliance.”).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 835 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The context here is one of racial limits that seek, not to keep
the races apart, but to bring them together.”).
See Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 370 (W.D. Ky. 2000)
(“[T]he Board steadfastly maintained its desire for an integrated, nondiscriminatory
school system. JCPS has treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a
legal obligation—they consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of
any well-rounded public school education. This Court joins Judges Gordon and
Ballantine in finding overwhelming evidence of the Board’s good faith compliance with
the desegregation Decree and its underlying purposes.”).
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 856 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“But if the [Jefferson County]
plan was lawful when it was first adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District
Court dissolved its order, how can the plurality now suggest that it became unlawful the
following day?”).
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are we going to do to avoid the situation where in some districts everybody is perhaps held in contempt almost immediately because that judge
has that disposition, and in some other districts it is twelve years before
64
they get to a hearing? What criteria do you propose?”

For years, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and academics have debated the reach and scope of Article
65
III courts, particularly in the field of school desegregation. At the
heart of these discussions lie the unique qualities that encompass the
66
federal judiciary.
Although Supreme Court decisions are considered to be the defining law by which all lower courts and legislatures must frame their
67
decisions and actions, the pronouncement of school integration
proved to be a decision that would have a peculiar effect on the na-

64
65

66

67

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 254.
See, e.g., S. 3395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1972 (providing for financial assistance to districts
under judicial order to desegregate to be subject to certain restrictions with respect to
time, distance, and the number of students involved in busing); Student Transportation
Moratorium Act of 1972, H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1972 (calling for a moratorium
on federal court ordered desegregation plans that required busing, reorganization of
school districts, and reassignment of students); MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO BUSING AND EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, AND
TRANSMITTING A DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM ON NEW
AND ADDITIONAL STUDENT TRANSPORTATION, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-195, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
at 15 (1972) (purporting to clarify existing constitutional case law on school
desegregation matters and deal with “the fears and concerns” relating to busing issues,
while the true intent of President Nixon’s message was rather to deny the federal
judiciary’s power to enforce busing as a desegregation remedy); Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article III: Seperating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205
(1985) (mentioning the recent proposals to restrict federal court jurisdiction in the
school desegregation context and offering a neo-Federalist interpretation of Article III);
Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 599 (1985)
(discussing the debated role of the federal judiciary in bills on busing).
See, e.g., Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“No provisions of the Constitution . . . are more explicit and
specific than those pertaining to courts established under Article III. ‘The judicial power’
which is ‘vested’ in these tribunals and the safeguards under which their judges function
are enumerated with particularity. Their tenure and compensation, the controversies
which may be brought before them, and the distribution of original and appellate
jurisdiction among these tribunals are defined and circumscribed, not left at large by
vague and elastic phrasing. . . . This was not due to chance or ineptitude on the part of
the Framers. The differences in subject-matter account for the drastic differences in
treatment. Great concepts like . . . ‘due process of law,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘property’ were
purposely left to gather meaning from experience. For they relate to the whole domain
of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well
that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.”).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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tion’s subsequent judicial and legislative judgments. 68 In contradiction to the Supreme Court’s history of expecting immediate national
69
compliance with judicial verdicts, the Court ordered the lawyers in
Brown I to return a few months later to answer questions about the
70
scope of the influence and impact of its decision. Although the decision in Brown I sought to offer relief to segregated school children
for the harms they suffered, the Court set no standard or deadline for
the desegregation of schools, and even contemplated whether it
should allow citizens to gradually accept the ruling, whether only certain citizens should be subject to relief under the law, and whether
71
the ruling should have a duration of enforcement. Ironically, in
spite of holding that all citizens are guaranteed equal protection under the law, the Justices avoided the responsibility of providing im72
mediate equal relief to all schoolchildren nationwide.

68

69

70

71
72

For example, after refusing to follow Brown I and Brown II, the Governor and legislature
of Arkansas argued that the states could nullify federal court decisions if they felt that the
federal courts were violating the Constitution. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected
this argument and held that only the federal courts can decide when the Constitution is
violated in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). However, on the very day the Court
announced the ruling, the Arkansas legislature responded by enacting a law permitting
the Governor to close any public school in the State, thereby stripping local school
districts of their decision-making authority so long as the Governor determined that local
officials could not maintain a suitable educational system. See Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 44–45 (E.D. La. 1960) (holding all statutes that directly or indirectly
required segregation of public schools unconstitutional, and thus invalidating the
Louisiana legislature’s effort to resist integration by granting the Governor the authority
to supersede any school board’s decision to integrate.); STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR
DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 49–67 (2010) (discussing the conditions in Little
Rock, Arkansas post-Brown).
See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351–52 (1938) (holding that
personal rights of equal protection cannot be denied due to difficulty of immediate
remedy).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 n.13 (1954) (listing questions for the lawyers
about implementation methods of a potential decision that segregation in public schools
is unconstitutional).
Id.
See Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1928 (1991) (“The Court had achieved agreement on the merits
[of Brown] in large measure because most of the Justices had a vague idea that they could
avoid difficulty by allowing desegregation to occur gradually. Yet . . . the more acute
problem was that they never truly decided what they wanted the [lower] courts to
accomplish [through judicial decrees].”). But see Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative
Action, Integration & Immigration Rights & Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary
(BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1632, 1654 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I firmly believe that
our role as judges includes policing the process of self-government and stepping in when
necessary to secure the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”).
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Consequently, a year after hearing rearguments from both sides in
73
response to the questions posed, the Court decided in Brown II that
74
schools were to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” Since this
decision likewise did not provide a clear timeline of when to eliminate segregation, despite the Court’s prior decree that required integration of public schools, the responsibility for integration and implementation had been left to local school boards and federal district
75
courts to achieve. This notion of “deliberate speed” and veritable
76
silence by the Supreme Court on the issue of desegregation from
77
1955 through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, served to
73

74

75

76

77

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. at 301 (1955) (“[T]he cases are remanded to the District
Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this
opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”).
Id. The Brown lawyers responded definitively that the Court should order the integration
of schools forthwith. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS
ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 9–10 (2004). On the other
hand, the lawyers for the districts that were being sued argued that integration would
cause irreparable harm to these communities; white hostility and violence would be
rampant and the loss of employment of black teachers would be eminent. Id.
Oppositional arguments also included rhetoric that many black children were inherently
retarded and bringing them into the schools would be detrimental to white students;
venereal diseases and illegitimate children would increase as a result of school
integration. Id.
See Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 885, 889–90 (1993) (“Brown is the only case I know of where the Supreme Court
found a constitutional violation but did not order immediate vindication. Even after the
‘all deliberate speed’ remediation ordered a year later in Brown II, the Supreme Court
allowed school boards to dawdle in fashioning meaningful desegregation
remedies. . . . Thus, from the start the message to the public was that the denial of equal
educational opportunities to black students is not as serious a constitutional violation as
other constitutional infractions.”).
The noteworthy exception to this silence is the Supreme Court’s forceful holding in
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), ordering the desegregation of Little Rock, Arkansas
schools after the Arkansas legislature amended the state constitution, under the doctrines
of nullification and interposition, to relieve the state of the responsibility to follow the
Brown decision. See also Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (holding that a
desegregation plan that included a provision allowing students to transfer from a school
in which their race was a minority to one in which it was the majority was in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment and contrary to Brown I); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S.
218 (1964) (concluding that the closing of a public school in Prince Edward County and
the use of state tuition grants and tax credits to support private segregated schools for
white children unconstitutionally denied the plaintiffs equal protection under the law
and were devices used to evade the constitutional mandate of desegregation).
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits the use of federal funds in programs that
discriminated on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Many have made the argument
that Brown I was the impetus for introducing such sweeping legislation in 1964. For a
more thorough discussion of the theory that the fear of violence among the citizenry—
not the federal courts—had the most profound effect of Congressional action to bring
about the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
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legitimize the noncompliance and further delay tactics by state and
78
local officials. Although the phrase “massive resistance” was coined
by U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, the sentiment behind it was expressed
by many states and local school boards toward the mandate of school
79
desegregation.
Federal district court judges were charged with the responsibility
to guide local school districts into compliance with the mandates
from Brown I and II, without guidelines of how the remedies for Equal
Protection violations would be implemented, who to include in the
80
group of wrongdoers or wronged citizens, and how the judiciary
would determine when the wronged parties were made whole. This
81
resulted in atypical remedies ordered for various districts.

78

79

80
81

COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 157 (1991) (“[P]ro-civil-rights forces existed
independent of the Supreme Court and could plausibly have accounted for eventual
congressional and executive branch action as well as for Court action. While we can
never know what would have happened if the Court had not acted as it did [in Brown],
the existence and strength of pro-civil-rights forces at least suggest that change would
have occurred, albeit at a pace unknown.”).
See Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of
Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 10 (1975) (“In retrospect the Supreme Court’s
heavy reliance on local school authorities and federal district court judges seems to have
been misplaced. . . .”).
“Massive Resistance” was a policy adopted in 1956 by Virginia’s state government to block
the desegregation of public schools mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court. See J. HARVIE
WILKINSON III, HARRY BYRD AND THE CHANGING FACE OF VIRGINIA POLITICS 1946–1966,
112–14, 151–54 (1968). The “Massive Resistance” policy reflected the views of many
southern politicians who had a disdain for federal government intrusion into state affairs
and believed that, if citizens were firm enough, the Supreme Court would reverse the
mandate for school integration. See Michael J. Klarman, Why Massive Resistance? 14 (Univ.
of Virginia Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 03-7, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410062 (“One cannot
know how many white southerners genuinely believed that Brown could be nullified and
segregation preserved. But many southern politicians spoke this way, and constituents
may well have believed what they wanted to. . . . A Louisiana legislator observed: ‘When
those birds in the Supreme Court realize we mean business, we’ll find we won’t have to
change our entire school system.’ A South Carolina judge expressed confidence that ‘this
decision will be eventually reversed, though it may take years.’ Countless other southern
politicians insisted that desegregation would not come ‘in a thousand years’ or in their
‘lifetime.’”).
One of the unusual things about Brown and school desegregation is that very few states
and school districts have obeyed the ruling without being directly and immediately sued.
Countless types of integration remedies were ordered by district court judges since the
Supreme Court did not proscribe a particular remedy for the legal violation. See, e.g.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29–31 (1971) (holding that
federal district courts could order busing to desegregate schools). See also DAVID J.
ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 11–16, 161–63 (1995)
(describing the conflict by various district courts in interpreting desegregation law and
the various remedies that were ordered, including busing, school transfer policies, school
choice methods, geographic attendance zones, and school closure).
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In an attempt to quell the numerous surreptitious tactics used to
82
evade integration cloaked as remedial plans, the Supreme Court of83
fered guidance nearly a decade post-Brown to lower courts in Green
84
v. New Kent with six factors that should be addressed in school district plans that would constitute a complete remedy: (1) student assignment; (2) hiring and assignment of faculty; (3) hiring and assignment of staff; (4) transportation; (5) extracurricular activities;
85
and (6) school facilities. The Supreme Court reaffirmed to school
86
districts that “the time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run out.”
The Court maintained that “[t]he burden on a school board today is
to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
87
promises realistically to work now.”
For nearly two decades the federal judiciary addressed significant
issues related to school desegregation efforts in the South, while the
88
North remained untouched, despite clear evidence of segregated
82

83

84
85
86
87
88

See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964) (holding that the action of the
County School Board in closing the public schools of Prince Edward County
simultaneously supported the private, segregated white schools that took their place and
denied black schoolchildren equal protection of the law and noting that “[t]here has
been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed” in achieving integration);
Raney v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 445–46 (1968) (holding that the freedom of choice
desegregation plan for a school system was an inadequate method of converting to a
unitary, nonracial system where no attendance zones were established and, after three
years of operation, not one white child had enrolled in the all-black school and over 85%
of the black children continued to attend the all-black school).
Very little desegregation was achieved in the nearly ten years post-Brown. “In the South,
just 1.2% of black school children were attending school with whites. In South Carolina,
Alabama, and Mississippi not one black child attended a public school with a white child
in the 1962–63 school year. In North Carolina, only one-fifth of one percent—or
0.026%—of all black students attended desegregated schools in 1961 and the figure did
not rise above one percent until 1965. Similarly, in Virginia, in 1964, only 1.63% of
blacks were attending desegregated schools.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The
Burger Court and the Failure To Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV.
999, 1004 (1994).
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Id. at 435.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 439.
See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“There is segregation in the schools of many of these [Northern]
cities fully as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the
past decade and a half. The focus of the school desegregation problem has now shifted
from the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and footdragging as the process was
in most places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been made in
Southern States. No comparable progress has been made in many nonsouthern cities
with large minority populations primarily because of the de facto/de jure distinction
nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which
denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South. But if our national concern is for
those who attend such schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
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public schooling experiences for children. 89 The efforts to integrate
northern schools highlighted the dissonance between legal rule and
90
The Supreme
judicial decision-making in forcing social change.
Court was forced to clarify whether the Constitution required integration or merely outlawed discrimination in districts and states that did
91
not have legally sanctioned apartheid, but segregated experiences in
92
practice.
In Keyes v. Denver School District, the first school desegregation case
that involved a major city outside of the South, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of applying Brown in areas where de facto as op93
posed to de jure segregation existed. The Court found that although there was no legal sanctioning of school segregation in this

89

90

91

92

93

rather than present reality, we must recognize that the evil of operating separate schools
is no less in Denver than in Atlanta.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
In 1968, 66.8% of all black children in the Northeast attended schools that were
predominately black; 42.7% of Northern black children attended schools that were 90–
100% black. GARY ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1968–1980, at 4 (1983), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/public-school-desegregation-in-the-united-states1968-1980/orfield_american-desegregation-1983.pdf. For a more detailed description of
national desegregation trends, see id. at xi-21.
Most northern states established public schools during the first half of the nineteenth
century, but black students were not automatically privy to the full benefits of these
public school systems. In some states, black children were excluded from the public
schools altogether. In others, black children were relegated to separate and inferior
schools. Ohio, for example, excluded black children from public schools until the late
1840s; Illinois did likewise until the 1860s. Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in
Accomplishing Racial Change: School Segregation in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L. REV. 677,
685 n.17 (1996). New York permitted the segregation of children in schools through
legislation. Id. at 685 n.18. However, a few northern states—Maine, Vermont, New
Hampshire, and Massachusetts—operated integrated schools by the mid-nineteenth
century. See id. 685. See generally Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment:
Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986) (providing a
comprehensive overview of the condition of blacks in the North during the nineteenth
century).
See, e.g., Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1031–32 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“Senator Javits recently summarized the problem: ‘Whatever you call it, ‘de facto
segregation,’ ‘racial unbalance,’ or ‘the absence of intergroup activity,’ it is a serious
block to effective education for children of minority groups anywhere in the country,
especially in the north and central part of the country where you don’t have the
established social order of segregation.’”) (citing Emergency School Aid Act of 1970:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Educ. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970)).
For a more complete discussion of the judicial distinction between the two notions in an
attempt to maintain segregated systems, see Robert L. Carter, Rexamining Brown TwentyFive Years Later: Looking Backward Into The Future, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615, 619–20
(1979) (discussing Judge Parker’s opinion in Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C.
1995)).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973).
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school district, the Board of Education, through the enactment of attendance zoning policies, created a separation of children by race
94
within the district. Through this decision, the Court held all school
districts responsible for practices that resulted in racial isolation in
their school systems, including constructing schools in racially isolated neighborhoods and gerrymandering attendance zones. Through
this decision, the Supreme Court, for the first time, also recognized
95
the rights of Latinos to attend desegregated educational settings.
96
The promise of nascent and expanded desegregation efforts effectively came to a halt with a series of Supreme Court decisions that
97
followed from 1974–1995. The Court began to establish boundaries
94

95

96

97

The Court opined greatly about the discriminatory intent behind de jure versus de facto
segregation. Id. at 210–11. But see Justice Douglas’ and Powell’s concurrences
recognizing that there is no difference between the two terms. Id. at 214–15 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“[T]here is, for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the school cases, no difference between de facto and
de jure segregation.”); id. at 219 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In
my view we should abandon a distinction which long since has outlived its time, and
formulate constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional application.”).
Id. at 197–98. See also Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947)
(holding that the segregation of children of Mexican descent in California public schools
was contrary to the laws of California and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by
depriving the children of: 1) liberty and property without due process of law, and 2) the
equal protection of the laws).
See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–30 (1971) (giving
district courts the power to gerrymander attendance zones, provide interdistrict remedies
in districts in communities where “white flight” resulted in a paucity of white students to
integrate schools, and enforce busing as a means to transport students to schools that
were not in their neighborhoods). Many lower courts ordered remediation in various
schools to help minority children make up for time in inferior segregated schools. See
e.g., Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F.Supp. 699, 770 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting “[s]o long as
the Constitution and laws are not violated, state school officials must be afforded the
broadest latitude to meet their educational responsibilities”); Barrera v. Wheeler, 475
F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1973) (examining questions relating to the lawful programming
and proper allocation of funds to educationally deprived children); United States v.
Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1971) (requiring school districts to institute a study of
the educational needs of minority children to ensure equal educational opportunities);
George v. O’Kelly, 448 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1971) (ordering the district court to
consider whether achievement grouping or remedial programs during the regular school
year result in racial segregation).
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99–102 (1995) (holding that the District Court
abused its discretion in imposing a tax increase to boost a magnet school program’s
attractiveness and discourage “white flight” from the inner city); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 269, 290–91 (1977) (authorizing lower courts to order states to fund additional
educational programs that would remedy the negative educational effects of prior
imposed segregation); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436–37 (1976)
(holding that a District Court exceeded its remedial authority in requiring annual
readjustment of school attendance zones in the Pasadena school district when changes in
the racial makeup of the schools were caused by demographic shifts “not attributed to
any segregative acts on the part of the [school district]”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
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and guidelines as to when school districts would be relieved of deseg98
regation efforts. In Board of Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell, the
Court for the first time attempted to put parameters around lower
court rulings with respect to when a district would be declared “unitary,” or no longer needing supervision because it operates under a
legal system free of the vestiges of past discrimination. The Court
acknowledged that there was inconsistent application of the system
99
that declared districts free of judicial oversight. The Court held that
school districts would be declared as having “unitary status” by achieving parity in the six factors outlined in the 1968 Green decision: (1)
student assignments; (2) faculty assignments; (3) staff assignments;
100
(4) transportation; (5) extracurricular activities; and (6) facilities.
Once the school district provided sufficient evidence to the Court
that it was compliant in these areas, it would be declared unitary and
101
would no longer be subjected to judicial oversight.
102
Nearly a year later, in the Freeman decision, the Court granted
more leeway to districts that had been held culpable of Constitutional
103
violations by holding that district courts could incrementally re104
treat from their supervisory functions before full desegregation

98
99
100
101
102
103

104

229, 240 (1976) (remarking that the existence of “both predominantly black and
predominantly white schools in a community is not alone violative of the Equal
Protection Clause”); Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746–48 (1974) (holding that
suburban districts could not be ordered to help desegregate a city’s schools unless the
plaintiffs could prove that those suburbs had illegally segregated them in the first place
despite some findings of intentional discrimination by both state and local officials that
intensified segregation in the metropolitan area).
498 U.S. 237 (1991).
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245 (“The lower courts have been inconsistent in their use of the term
‘unitary.’”).
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250.
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that although district courts have the
power to impose appropriate relief when constitutional violations are found on the part
of local school authorities, local control of schools is a vital national tradition that must
be maintained and district courts must return schools to the control of local authorities at
the earliest practicable date in order to maintain true accountability. See Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 410 (1977) [hereinafter Dayton I]; Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U. S. 717, 741–42 (1974); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973);
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972). But see Robert L. Carter, Public
School Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 891 (1993) (“The
federal courts should not run our nation’s educational system, but they do have a serious
obligation to stand guard for as long as it takes to ensure that the constitutional right of
black children to equal education is fulfilled.”).
For a more complete discussion on how Freeman permits nonunitary school districts to
resegregate their schools and how such incremental resegregation can result in release
from judicial supervision of formerly segregated schools which have yet to remove their
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compliance had been achieved in every area of school operations.105
The Court maintained that critical to the determination of whether
school districts are in compliance and judicial withdrawal is proper is:
whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree
in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn;
whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to
achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system;
and whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to
the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good-faith commitment to the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions of the
law and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention
106
in the first instance.

The Court maintained that district courts should look to school districts’ records of compliance to make determinations of whether ju107
dicial intervention should be relieved.
However, to the benefit of the children being served in schools
under the court order, the Supreme Court upheld the discretion of
district courts to exercise flexibility in the application of the Green fac108
tors that determine whether unitary status has been found. In Freeman, the Supreme Court upheld the discretion of the District Court’s
finding that the quality of education that black students received was
inferior to that of their white counterparts because teachers in
schools with a higher percentage of white students were better cre109
dentialed and had greater experience, and because per pupil expenditure in majority white schools exceeded that of majority black

105

106
107

108

109

racially identifiable characters, see Bradley W. Joondeph, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle
Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 147, 161–67
(1993).
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992) (“[U]pon a finding that a school system
subject to a court-supervised desegregation plan is in compliance in some but not all [six
Green factor] areas, the court in appropriate cases may return control to the school system
in those [six Green factor] areas where compliance has been achieved, limiting further
judicial supervision to operations that are not yet in full compliance with the court
decree.”).
Id. at 491.
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991) (“The District Court should
address itself to whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation
decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been
eliminated to the extent practicable.”).
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492–93 (“The District Court’s approach illustrates that the Green
factors need not be a rigid framework. It illustrates also the uses of equitable
discretion.”).
See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 96 (1979) (describing the desegregation of faculty in schools as
“the least visible and most flammable part of the entire school picture”).
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schools. 110 The school district was ordered to equalize spending between the schools and remedy the other inequities.
Ironically in 1992, the first case to interpret the consequences of
the Dowell and Freeman decisions was the then forty-year-old Brown
111
In this instance, the Tenth Circuit very narrowly applied the
case.
Freeman decision and would not incrementally release the school district from judicial review in its finding that the Topeka school district
had not shown good faith compliance in its commitment to integra112
The Court of Appeals opined “[t]o expect the lingering eftion.
fects of legally mandated separation to magically dissolve with as little
113
effort as the Topeka school district exerted, is to expect too much.”
After sixty years of varying levels of effort behind the integrative
tenets of Brown I by the judiciary, federal, and state legislatures and
the executive branches of governments, federal district, and appellate
courts are now left in the untenable positions of finding congruence
with the school district cases that remain on their dockets under judicial order to desegregate. The most recent holding by the Supreme
Court in Parents Involved that voluntary plans that solely contemplate
race conscious student assignments are not narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest places a new burden on district
court judges who are deciding pivotal local desegregation cases. The
impact of granting unitary status to districts becomes even greater
now that districts will be foreclosed from engaging in race-conscious
decisions upon release from desegregation court orders.
In the years since Parents Involved, scholars have speculated as to
114
the long-term impact the case will have on the desegregation efforts
115
of districts. For sure, even the Parents Involved Court disagreed as to
110
111

112
113
114

115

Freeman, 503 U.S. at 483–84.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992). For a more complete discussion of
the application of Freeman in this case and the ease with which Freeman allows districts to
be released from judicial oversight, even when racially identifiable schools have not been
dismantled, see Carter, supra note 103, at 892–93 (disussing the Tenth Circuit’s
reinterpretation of Freeman after the Supreme Court’s 1992 remand of Brown).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 590.
See, e.g., Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved Challenge:
Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1019–20 (2008)
(positing that, in Parents Involved, the Court failed to provide a remedy for the problem of
increasing racial isolation in K-12 schools); Alyssa M. Simon, “Race” to the Bottom?:
Addressing Student Body Diversity in Charter Schools After Parents Involved, 10 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 399, 417 (2011) (stating “[t]he ultimate impact of Parents Involved may be more
symbolic than critics of the opinion suggest”).
Some in academia posit that desegregation is no longer a goal of most schools and
therefore the Parents Involved ruling on voluntary desegregation efforts is moot. They
maintain that the greater challenge in modern day education reform is the battle in state
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whether the outcome of the decision would have far-reaching ef116
fects. The social milieu is that far fewer districts nationwide are fo117
cused on school integration issues, and the judiciary now has less
power by which to enforce remedial measures even over districts that
are under court order. It is clear that federal courts may not hold
118
school districts under judicial court orders in perpetuity. However,
the data continues to evidence that once districts are released from
119
120
Given this context of
judicial oversight, they will resegregate.
fewer options available to districts to voluntarily combat increased

116

117

118

119

120

courts and legislatures over school funding, school choice, standards and testing, and
access to preschool. For a more complete discussion on the broader implications of
school desegregation and school reform efforts, see James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and
Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 132 (2007) (describing how the modern
reform agenda of most school districts does not include racial integration, and has not
for over twenty years).
Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 745
(2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (“Justice Breyer’s dissent ends on an unjustified note of alarm.”),
with id. at 863 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Until today, this Court understood the
Constitution as affording the people, acting through their elected representatives,
freedom to select the use of ‘race-conscious criteria from among their available
options. . . . Today however, the Court restricts . . . that leeway. I fear the consequences
of doing so for the law, for the schools. . . .”) (citation omitted).
Several states that do operate segregated systems, albeit those of de facto segregation,
have focused their efforts on financial equity issues. See, e.g., M.A. v. State-Operated Sch.
Dist. of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 341, 352 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that special education
services must be provided on a timely basis); Gannon v. Kansas, 319 P.3d 1196, 1251
(Kan. 2014) (finding inequities in school funding throughout state schools); Abbott v.
Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 411–12 (N.J. 1990) (holding that students in the poorest urban
districts were deprived of their constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education
due to the State’s failure to provide adequate financial resources for their educational
programming); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 801 N.E.2d 326, 367 (N.Y.
2003) (holding that a state funding system failed to provide a sound basic education to
the city’s school children in violation of the New York Constitution).
Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991) (holding that that it is imperative that
desegregation orders be dissolved once a school district has demonstrated compliance for
a reasonable amount of time).
Some district courts have also examined school districts that are under court order to
desegregate that have desegregated and then resegregated while under court order and
found that the subsequent racial imbalance while under court order does not constitute
de jure segregation. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 478 (1992); NAACP, Jacksonville
Branch v. Duval Cnty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 969–73 (11th Cir. 2001).
See Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? 38–39
(2004), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/brown-at-50-king2019s-dream-or-plessy2019s-nightmare/orfieldbrown-50-2004.pdf (showing that of the thirty-five school districts examined in this study
that were released from judicial court order, a large majority saw more than a ten percent
decline in the percent of white students in the class of a typical black student).
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segregation since Parents Involved, 121 what are the practical academic
outcomes for students in these districts? How will federal district
courts maintain the spirit and mandates of Brown I while enforcing
the mandates of Parents Involved?
III.

DOES DESEGREGATION MATTER ONCE SCHOOLS ARE DECLARED
UNITARY?

Mr. Rankin (on behalf of the United States): “Now if you look back at
the history of the schools in the North and also throughout the South,
you will see that everybody was involved in the problem of “What are we
122
going to do to educate the Negro?”

This Part identifies the school districts that courts declared unitary
123
The districts selected for
since the 2007 Parents Involved decision.
review have been particularly identified in an effort to determine if
there has been any change to their graduation rates since their release from judicial court order. Justice Breyer in his dissent in Parents
124
Involved warned of the detrimental effects of limiting the power of
school districts that choose to voluntarily engage in desegregation efforts, including a decline in achievement test scores of children of all
125
The importance that our nation has placed on high school
races.
121

122
123

124
125

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 865–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Yesterday, school boards had
available to them a full range of means to combat segregated schools. Today they do
not.”).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 246 .
The school desegregation opinions in this Part were obtained from both Lexis and
Westlaw, two commonly used empirical tools for obtaining judicial opinions. The
searches include both cases that were published and unpublished. However, there may
be more opinions that have been rendered in this area of the law that are excluded from
this survey because some District Court judges may have released school districts through
oral opinions not reflected in a written opinion. Additionally, a major limitation in
tracking school desegregation cases is that the United States is not a party to every case;
therefore, the U.S. Department of Justice does not have a compendium of all cases that
exist with which to determine their progress. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
BECOMING LESS SEPARATE?:
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF UNITARY STATUS 111–71 (2007), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/092707_BecomingLessSeparateReport.pdf; Wendy Parker,
The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C.L.
REV. 1623, 1628 n.36 (2002); Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 1157, 1195–97 (2000).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 839 (2007).
Racial and economic integration at the K–12 level has been linked to considerable
academic improvements, particularly for minority students. Racially integrated schools
“are more likely to have stable staffs composed of highly qualified teachers—the single
most important resource for academic achievement, and to have better school climates
(academically oriented peers, lower dropout rates, more parents with higher
expectations) than racially isolated schools.” PHILIP TEGELER, ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON,
& MARTHA BOTTIA, RESEARCH BRIEF NO.4: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT SCHOOL INTEGRATION,
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graduation, 126 and the societal consequences of our children not
graduating from high school has been historically recognized by
courts and social scientists. Additionally, research has evidenced that
only 64% of African-American children graduate from high school
127
on time, as compared with 82% of whites. This disparity is particu128
If graduation rates
larly pernicious in racially segregated schools.
were adversely affected post-dissolution of judicial court orders, the
evidence would support a finding that an educational interest in racially integrated schools is in fact a compelling one that would survive
129
strict scrutiny.
130
Although state educational standards vary, over the past three
131
decades public schools have been increasingly pressured to demon-

126

127

128
129

130

131

COLLEGE ATTENDANCE, AND THE REDUCTION OF POVERTY (2011) (internal footnotes
omitted), available at http://www.school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo4
.pdf.
See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 113 (1973) (“Thus, in the final
analysis, ‘the pivotal position of education to success in American society and its essential
role in opening up to the individual the central experiences of our culture lend it an
importance that is undeniable.’”).
See THE EDUC. TRUST, THE STATE OF EDUC. OF AFRICAN AMS., available at
http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/AfricanAm%20Booklet.pdf (describing
the gaps that persist between black and white students in a K-12 school context).
GARY ORFIELD, DROPOUTS IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 64
(2004).
The Roberts decision in Parents Involved asserts that “[t]he [districts’ plans] are directed
only to racial balance, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as
illegitimate . . . [r]ather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to
obtain the asserted educational benefits.”) Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 704. See also, id. at
843 (Breyer J., dissenting) (“The compelling interest at issue here . . . includes an effort
to create school environments that provide better educational opportunities for all
children; it includes an effort to create citizens better prepared to know, to understand,
and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of
democratic government our Constitution foresees. If an educational interest that
combines these three elements is not ‘compelling,’ what is?”( internal citations omitted)).
Unlike the United States Constitution, which does not refer to education, many state
constitutions require states to provide some level of “adequate” education to its citizens.
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 111–12, (1973) (“[I]n 48 of our 50 States the provision of public
education is mandated by the state constitution. No other state function is so uniformly
recognized as an essential element of our society’s well-being.”).
By the 2005–2006 school year, states who received funding under the Federal No Child
Left Behind grant program were required to begin testing students in grades 3–8
annually in reading and mathematics. See Issues A-Z: No Child Left Behind, EDITORIAL
PROJECTS IN EDUC. RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/
no-child-left-behind/. By the 2007–2008 school year, they had to test students in science
at least once in elementary, middle, and high school. The tests had to be aligned with
state academic standards. Id. States were required to bring all students up to the
“proficient” level on state tests by the 2013–2014 school year. Id. Individual schools had
to meet state “adequate yearly progress” targets toward this goal (based on a formula
spelled out in the Elementary and Secondary Elementary School Act) for both their
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strate increased educational accountability toward the students they
132
serve. It has been noted in several studies that the impact of school
level accountability policies have been particularly pernicious in pre133
State testing programs
dominantly minority segregated schools.
that regularly publish school level testing data frequently identify segregated minority schools with concentrated poverty as low perform134
ing schools. Additionally, research has maintained that racially segregated schools have lower graduation rates than do racially diverse
135
Given this information, it is critical to review the educaschools.
tional outcomes of students who attend schools that are released
from desegregation court orders, since it is likely that those schools

132

133
134

135

student populations as a whole and for certain demographic subgroups. Id. Starting with
the 2002–2003 school year, states were required to furnish annual report cards showing a
range of information, including student-achievement data broken down by subgroup and
information on the performance of school districts. Id. By the end of the 2005–2006
school year, every teacher in core content areas working in a public school had to be
“highly qualified” in each subject taught. Id.
Department of Education Secretary T. H. Bell created the National Commission on
Excellence in Education in 1981, directing it to examine the quality of education in the
United States and to make a report to the nation. A Nation at Risk – April 1983, DEP’T OF
EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/intro.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
The Commission was created as a result of the Secretary’s concern about “the widespread
public perception that something is seriously remiss in our educational system.” Id.
Since then, there has been a growing national focus on increased excellence and greater
accountability in schools. Id. Most recently, federal initiatives such as “No Child Left
Behind” and “Race to the Top” have mandated competency tests for students and greater
reporting of outcomes by districts receiving federal money for education reform efforts.
See DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/esea (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) (focusing on
policy initiatives undertaken by the department).
ORFIELD, supra note 128.
See Gary Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, HARV.
UNIV. CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 2, 12 (2001), available at
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/
ED459217.pdf (“Anyone who wants to explore the continuing inequalities need only
examine the test scores, dropout rates, and other statistics for various schools in a
metropolitan community and relate them to statistics for school poverty (free lunch) and
race (percent black and/or Latino) to see a distressingly clear pattern. The state testing
programs, which now publish school level test data in almost all states, identify schools as
low performing, many of which are segregated minority schools with concentrated
poverty. There is a very strong correlation between the percent poor in a school and its
average test score. Therefore, minority students in segregated schools, no matter how
able they may be as individuals, usually face a much lower level of competition and
average preparation by other students. Such schools tend to have teachers who are
themselves much more likely to be teaching a subject they did not study and with which
they have had little experience.”)
See e.g., Susan E. Mayer, How Much Does a High School’s Racial and Socioeconomic Mix
Affect Graduation and teenage Fertility Rates?, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 332
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (“As a school’s mean SES fell, as its
student body became more economically diverse, and as its minority enrollment
increased, tenth graders of any given race . . . were more likely to drop out.”).
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either will resegregate, 136 or even be released from judicial oversight
137
already segregated. Since it is unlikely that the federal legislative or
executive branches will make educational policy decisions with inte138
gration as a goal, such information will be critical for federal judges, the sole branch with authority to impact desegregation efforts, to
consider as they make determinations of whether districts should be
returned to local control.
The information presented in Appendix A is a compendium of
the cases identified since 2007 in which courts made determinations
of unitary status motions. Additionally, the chart identifies some of
the key issues that the court reviewed when deciding the motion,
whether the district court compelled the parties in the action to attend a status hearing due to prolonged inactivity in the case, and
whether the United States government filed any objections to the
motion for unitary status. Lastly, the chart identifies the graduation
139
140
Where available, dropout data were also
rates for each district.
included for the districts.
136

137

138

139

See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, Historic Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and the
Need for New Integration Strategies, UCLA CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT 5–6 (2007) (“Resegregation,
which took hold in the early 1990s after three Supreme Court decisions from 1991 to
1995 limiting desegregation orders, is continuing to grow in all parts of the country for
both African Americans and Latinos and is accelerating the most rapidly in the only
region that had been highly desegregated—the South. . . . Many of these segregated black
and Latino schools have now been sanctioned for not meeting the requirements of No
Child Left Behind and segregated high poverty schools account for most of the ‘dropout
factories’ at the center of the nation’s dropout crisis.”).
Courts will routinely excuse districts with segregated schools on the grounds of private
housing choices, and nevertheless grant unitary status motions. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 495 (1992).
See ORFIELD, supra note 134, at 6 (“There has been no significant positive initiative from
Congress, the White House or the Courts to desegregate the schools for more than 30
years.”); see also GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 16–18 (1996) (describing the
opposition to school desegregation during the Reagan administration and, particularly,
the hostility toward specific integration remedies such as busing by the Department of
Justice). But see Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial
Isolation In Elementary and Secondary Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF J. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2011)
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html
(detailing the ways in which elementary and secondary schools can legally, in light of
Parents Involved, pursue the compelling educational interest of reducing the very high
level of separate and unequal schooling that may exist in their districts by drawing on the
words of the Supreme Court to clearly communicate a range of legally and educationally
sound approaches for educators and communities to consider). Nevertheless, in spite of
this progressive guidance, the administration has offered no policy guidance or decisions
which have set integration as a goal.
These data are limited solely to four-year graduation rates. Additionally, these graduation
rate data consider the rates of the districts overall, and do not take into account students
who are graduating in alternate settings within the districts, including juvenile justice
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IV. TRENDS IN UNITARY STATUS MOTIONS DETERMINATIONS
As Appendix A reveals, there have been twenty-four judicial cases
since 2007 where decisions were published with respect to unitary sta141
These cases involved desegregation orders in twentytus motions.
142
143
Of the twenty-four
three school districts in ten different states.
144
145
cases, fifteen motions were granted unitary status, four were
146
granted unitary status with prejudice, three were granted partial
147
148
unitary status, and two were denied unitary status.

140

141

142

143
144
145

146

facilities or alternative schools. Additionally, these data are not disaggregated by race,
socioeconomic class or disability.
Graduation data were gathered from individual districts and state department of
education websites from the publicly available report card data. Therefore, the amount
of data available and the years for which the data are available are particular to each
district and state. In the cases of districts for which the data were not available online,
individual state departments of education were contacted telephonically to obtain such
information.
An additional motion was granted in the case of United States v. Bakersfield City Sch. Dist.,
No. 1:84-cv-00039 OWW JLT, 2011 WL 121638 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011), however, it was
not included in Appendix A because the Bakersfield School District is a K-8 district and
does not graduate high school students.
Madison County, Mississippi; Tucson, Arizona; Houston County, Alabama; Phoenix
Union High School, Arizona; Galveston, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Shelby County,
Tennessee; Little Rock, Arkansas; North Little Rock, Arkansas; Pulaski, Arkansas;
Alamance-Burlington, North Carolina; Monroe County, Tennessee; Jackson County,
Tennessee; Madison Parish, Louisiana; Caldwell Parish, Louisiana; Lowndes County,
Mississippi; Evangeline Parish, Louisiana; Ouachita Parish, Louisiana; St. Martin Parish,
Louisiana; City of Monroe, Louisiana; Morehouse Parish, Louisiana; Sumter, South
Carolina; Franklin Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 2-16.
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas. Id.
Some cases involved multiple motions for more than one school district.
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2011); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
North Little Rock Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 2009); Robinson v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 566 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Madison Cnty., 517 F.3d 292
(5th Cir. 2008); Randall v. Sumter Sch. Dist. No. 2, No-3:63-CV-1240, 2013 WL 3786344
(D.S.C. July 18, 2013); United States v. Morehouse Parish Sch. Bd., No. 69-14429, 2013
WL 291578 (W.D. La. Mar. 4, 2013); Graham v. Evangeline Parish Sch. Bd., No. 65-11053,
2012 WL 1833400 (W.D. La. May 16, 2012); United States v. Caldwell Parish Sch. Bd., No.
71-CV-16751, 2011 WL 2634086 (W.D. La July 5, 2011); Williams v. Kimbrough, No. 6511329, 2010 WL 1790516 (W.D. La. May 3, 2010); United States v. Alamance-Burlington
Bd. of Educ., 640 F. Supp. 2d 670 (M.D.N.C. 2009); United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.,
663 F. Supp. 2d 649 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Smiley v. Blevins, 626 F. Supp.2d 659 (S.D. Tex.
2009); Castro v. Phoenix Union High Sch., Nos. 82-302-PHX-RCB, 85-1249-PHX-RCB,
2008 WL 324229 (D. Ariz. 2008); Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 549 F. Supp. 2d
1132 (D. Ariz. 2008); Lee v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:70-CV-1058, 2008 WL
166954 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2008); Lee v. Dothan City, No. 70-CV-1060 WHA, 2007 WL
1856928 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2007). See infra Appendix A, at 2–16.
See Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 965 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. La. 2013); United
States v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., No. 70-15632, 2013 WL 4017093 (W.D. La. Aug. 6,
2013); Gray v. Lowndes Cnty. Sch. Dist., 900 F. Supp. 2d 703 (N.D. Miss. 2012); Monroe v.
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A review of the graduation rate data shows mixed results, largely
because eight of the motions were decided between 2012 and 2013
149
and graduation data are not yet available for those districts. Of the
fifteen districts granted unitary status with timely graduation data
150
available, seven have decreased graduation rates, seven have in151
152
The discreased graduation rates, and one remained the same.
tricts denied unitary status with relevant reported data has a de153
creased graduation rate, and the one district granted partial unitary
154
status has an increased graduation rate.
Phoenix Union High School District reported its data by individual school. Of the fifteen high schools in the district, eleven experi155
156
enced a decrease in graduation rate, three had an increase and
157
one maintained the same 100% graduation rate. While the graduation rates that decreased varied, it is critical to highlight that Suns Diamondbacks Academy has fallen to a 26% graduation rate; this re-

147

148
149

150

151

152
153
154
155

156
157

Jackson-Madison Cnty. Sch. Sys., C.A. No. 72-1327, 2010 WL 3732015 (W.D. Tenn. Sept.
24, 2010).
Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., No-66-12171, 2012 WL 4471643 (W.D. La. Sept. 27,
2012); Andrews v. City of Monroe, No. 65-11297, 2012 WL 2357310 (W.D. La. June 20,
2012); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 4-82cv00866-BSM, 2011 WL
1935332 (E.D. Ark. May 19, 2011).
Fisher v. Tucson, 652 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2011); Thomas v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd., 879
F. Supp.2d 535 (W.D. La. 2012).
Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 965 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. La. 2013); United States v.
Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., No. 70-15632, 2013 WL 4017093 (W.D. La. Aug. 6, 2013);
Randall v. Sumter Sch. Dist., No-3:63-CV-1240, 2013 WL 3786344 (D.S.C. July 18, 2013);
United States v. Morehouse Parish Sch. Bd., No. 69-14429, 2013 WL 291578 (W.D. La.
March 4, 2013); Thomas v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 535 (W.D. La.
2012); Andrews v. City of Monroe, No. 65-11297, 2012 WL 2357310 (W.D. La June 20,
2012); Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., No-66-12171, 2012 WL 4471643 (W.D. La. Sept.
27, 2012); Graham v. Evangeline Parish Sch. Bd., No. 65-11053, 2012 WL 1833400 (W.D.
La. May 16, 2012).
Shelby County, Tennessee; Madison County, Mississippi; Houston, Alabama; Phoenix
Unified High School; Little Rock, Arkansas; North Little Rock, Arkansas; Tucson, Arizona
(however, the Tucson determination of unitary status was later reversed and the motion
was denied). See infra Appendix A, at 2–5, 7–8.
Galveston, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Alamance-Burlington, North Carolina; Monroe
County, Tennessee; Jackson County, Tennessee; Madison County, Louisiana; Lowndes
County, Mississippi. See infra Appendix A, at 2, 6, 9, 11–12.
Caldwell Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 10–11.
Tucson, Arizona. See infra Appendix A, at 3.
Pulaski, Arkansas. See infra Appendix A, at 8.
Alahambra High School; Betty Fairfax High School; Carl Hayden High School; Central
High School; Franklin Police and Fire High School; Maryvale High School; MetroTech
High School; North High School; South Mountain High School; Suns Diamondbacks
Academy; Trevor Brown High Academy. See infra Appendix A, at 4–5.
Bostrom Alternative Center; Camelback High School; Cesar Chavez High School. See
infra Appendix A, at 4–5.
Phoenix Union Bio-Science High School. See infra Appendix A, at 5.

Feb. 2015]

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT

657

flects that thirty-six of the 135 eligible students in the cohort graduated.
Although dropout data were not available for all of the districts
reviewed, it is critical to note that of the seven unitary districts that
reported increased graduation rates, three of them also reported
their dropout data. All three districts have reported increased dropout rates during the same time period that they have reported in158
creased graduation rates. Of the seven districts that had unitary status motions decided in 2012–2013, for which timely graduation rate
comparison data are not yet available, five have reported their dropout rates for the 2013 school year. Two districts granted unitary sta159
tus have demonstrated increased drop-out rates, and one district
160
granted unitary status has exhibited a stable drop-out rate. The district granted partial unitary status in 2012 has a decreased drop-out
161
The district denied unitary status in 2012 has a stable droprate.
162
out rate.
Of the twenty-four motions decided, the courts noted that there
were no objections by the United States Government in seventeen
163
The United States objected to the unitary status motion in
cases.
164
four cases, and in three cases, the plaintiffs and the defendants filed
165
In four cases, the court initiated
joint motions for unitary status.
the review of the unitary status of the district after prolonged inactivi166
ty in the cases by both parties.

158
159
160
161
162
163

164
165
166

Monroe County, Tennessee; Jackson County, Tennessee; and Madison Parish, Louisiana.
See infra Appendix A, at 9–11.
Morehouse Parish, Louisiana and Franklin Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 15–
16.
Ouachita Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 13–14.
City of Monroe, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 15.
St. Martin Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 14.
Houston County, Alabama; Tucson, Arizona; Phoenix, Arizona; Galveston, Texas; Little
Rock, North Little Rock, Pulaski, Arkansas; Jackson and Monroe Counties, Tennessee;
Madison Parish, Louisiana; Caldwell Parish, Louisiana; Lowndes County, Mississippi;
Evangeline Parish, Louisiana; Ouachita Parish, Louisiana; St. Martin Parish, Louisiana;
Morehouse Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 3–4, 6–15.
Madison County, Mississippi; Chicago, Illinois; City of Monroe, Louisiana; Franklin
Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 2, 6, 15–16.
Shelby County, Tennessee; Alamance-Burlington, North Carolina; Sumter, South
Carolina. See infra Appendix A, at 7, 9, 16.
Franklin Parish, Louisiana; Caldwell Parish, Louisiana; Ouachita Parish, Louisiana; St.
Martin Parish, Louisiana. See infra Appendix A, at 10–11, 13–14, 16.
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V. “WHAT’S A COURT TO DO?”
Mr. Marshall (on behalf of appellants): “The duty of enforcing the Four167
teenth Amendment is placed upon this Court . . . .”
Mr. Wilson (on behalf of the State of Kansas): “[A]ny decision that this
Court makes in this case will become the law of the case. In that sense,
certainly the entire matter is within the judicial power. However . . . we
are constrained to recognize a great deal of limitation and restraint upon
168
that exercise.”

The U.S. Department of Education released a report indicating
that during the 2011–2012 school year more than 1,200 local educational agencies, inclusive of school districts and charter schools in
forty-eight states, self-reported that that they were under a federal desegregation plan that was either ordered by a court or entered into
with the Office for Civil Rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
169
Those desegregation plans affect nearly 7.7 million stuof 1964.
dents. These desegregation plans mandate a range of actions that
districts must take, such as reducing racial isolation in schools, increasing the diversity of faculty, ensuring all students have access to
rigorous courses, and improving the quality of capital facilities and
classroom materials. Concurrent to courts making determinations on
unitary status motions, research continues to illustrate that most districts released from court orders to desegregate are rapidly resegre170
gating. Contemporaneous to these demographic changes and judi-

167

168
169

170

Transcript of Rebuttal Argument, Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), quoted in BROWN V.
BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 238 (Leon
Friedman ed., 2004).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note13, at 268, 271.
School Desegregation Plans: A National Census, EDUC. WK., May 13, 2014,
www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/desegregation-map.html. Notably, Hawaii and
Nevada did not report to the U.S. Department of Education that they operated under a
federal desegregation plan. Id. See id. for a more complete view of the total number of
desegregation plans and the states where these plans are in effect.
GARY ORFIELD, ERICA FRANKENBERG, JONGYEON EE & JOHN KUSCERA, Brown at 60: Great
Progress, a Long Retreat and an Uncertain Future, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 27–30
(2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertainfuture/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf (exhibiting the decrease in enrollment of white students
during the period from 2001 to 2011 and adapting the results demonstrated in Sean F.
Reardon, Elena Grewal, Demetra Kalogrides & Erica Greenberg, Brown Fades: The End of
Court-Ordered School Desegregation and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 899–900 (2012), available at http://cepa.stanford.edu/content/
brown-fades-end-court-ordered-school-desegregation-and-resegregation-american-publicschools)). A review of the fifty largest districts to receive unitary status reveals that most of
these districts are resegregating. See ORFIELD et al. supra. See id. for a more complete
overview of all the states reviewed.
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cial determinations, the legislative171 and executive branches continue
to enforce various educational accountability measures for districts to
172
meet. Yet in spite of the educational policies set forth at the legislative and executive levels to meet educational standards, veritably no
policies have been set forth with respect to issues regarding segrega173
tion. Once again, in the face of moderate support by the executive
174
175
branch, and veritably no support by the legislative branch, the

171

172

173

174

175

Congress has not been able to enact any major federal education law since the No Child
Left Behind Act in 2002. See New Maerica Foundation, No Child Left Behind—Overview,
FEDERAL EDUC BUDGET PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2014 3:55 pm), http://febp.newamerica.net/
background-analysis/no-child-left-behind-overview.
The Obama administration awarded “Race To the Top” grants to states implementing
innovative education reform plans and waiver polices related to the No Child Left Behind
Act for districts that could not meet the set goals. See Race to the Top Fund, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2014), www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html, for more
information on the policy guidance.
While the Obama administration did take action in releasing guidance in 2011 on ways in
which districts could take efforts to voluntarily integrate in light of Parents Involved, and
the administration has been very active in supporting various ways to assess teachers to
assure that students are taught by high-level educators, bold support behind school
integration efforts has been scant. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Guidance on the Voluntary
Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 3, 2012), available at
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html.
It should be noted that the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education and
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice under the Obama administration
have been more active about enforcement of desegregation orders than they were in
previous presidential administrations in recent history. Cf. President Barack Obama,
Presidential Proclamation—60th Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, THE WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (May 15, 2014), www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/05/15/presidential-proclamation-60th-anniversary-brown-v-board-education
(“Yet today, the hope and promise of Brown remains unfulfilled. In the years to come, we
must continue striving toward equal opportunities for all our children, from access to
advanced classes to participation in the same extracurricular activities. Because when
children learn and play together, they grow, build, and thrive together.”); THE EROSION
OF RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/03/pdf/
civil_rights_report.pdf (criticizing the administration of President George W. Bush for its
record on civil rights advancement and removal of the lack of authority of the
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division with respect to the use of race conscious
voluntary integration by districts); The Bush Administration Takes Aim: Civil Rights Under
Attack, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND (2003) available at
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/taking_aim/bush_takes_aim.pdf
(critiquing the Bush administration’s prioritization of states’ rights—and consequent
limitation of the ability of Congress to enact civil rights policies—and use of federal
authority to stop the civil rights policies with which they disagree).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically removes racial integration in its definition of
desegregation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (“‘Desegregation’ means the assignment of
students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race, color,
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goal of school integration and enforcing Brown v. Board, lies in the
hands of the judiciary. As noted in several of the cases presented in
this Article, many of the unitary status motions were made only at the
behest of federal district courts that requested an update from parties
in cases who had not reported anything to the court with respect to
desegregation efforts in several years. Given the resegregation
trends, particularly in the northern part of the country, it is imperative that judges place the responsibility in the hands of the parties to
continue their efforts to end the vestiges of poor educational oppor176
tunity.
An analysis of the cases heard since Parents Involved in this Article
demonstrates that the Department of Justice does not always intervene or provide guidance to the courts with respect to desegregation
orders, even in the face of continuing segregation. For example, in
Chicago, the court was deliberate in asserting that despite evidence of
the school district not providing a high quality education to students,
the U.S. government had not filed a complaint in the twenty-eightyear history of the case, despite the annual reports submitted by the
177
Furthermore, in spite of a showdefendants to the federal courts.
ing of increased segregation and very little effort on the part of the
defendant to make substantive changes in student or faculty assignments, the Court of Appeals showed deference to the Shelby County,
Tennessee motion because the motion was made as a joint effort by
178
the plaintiffs, the U.S. government, and the school district.
Given the judiciary’s unique role of being the sole body with an
opportunity to make an impact on the formulation of desegregation
orders, and to force the continued enforcement and determine the
scope and duration of such orders, it is imperative for the judiciary to
have a full understanding of the impact of such decisions. Although
precedent precludes federal judges from allowing school districts to
voluntarily enforce race conscious integration policies, it is of critical
importance for the judiciary to grasp the impact of allowing racial
segregation to persist, whether that segregation is de jure or de facto.

176

177
178

religion, sex or national origin, but ‘desegregation’ shall not mean the assignment of
students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance.”).
Data indicate that in the 2011–2012 school year, the following states had the most black
students attending schools that were 90–100% minority: New York, 64.6%; Illinois,
61.3%; Maryland, 53.1%; New Jersey, 48.5%; and Pennsylvania, 46%. For more
information with respect to the most segregated states for black and latinos, see ORFIELD,
ET. AL., supra note 170, at 20.
United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 663 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
Robinson v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 566 F.3d 642, 650 (6th Cir. 2009).
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Racial isolation in public schools is particularly pernicious because
it is associated with a host of other forms of isolation that impede
learning opportunities for students of color. While it is evident that
public school integration is not the sole means to address persistent
racial and socioeconomic disparities in educational opportunities,
the judiciary should be aware of the harms that are associated with
such isolation; they are the very same harms that were admonished by
the Brown court. These harms include less experienced and less qualified teachers, high levels of teacher turnover, less successful peer
179
groups, and inadequate facilities. Research has evidenced for many
years that students in schools with high concentrations of poverty suf180
fer from poorer academic achievement outcomes. Segregated public schools are also less likely to offer Advanced Placement or other
honors level courses that will make students better prepared for col181
Other factors—including expulsion rates, dropout
lege study.
rates, success in college, test scores, and graduation rates—are all
182
more negatively impacted in segregated schools. Research has evidenced that even for states with the lowest graduation rates, the
graduation rate for blacks and Latinos is still lower than 20% of the
183
statewide average. It is just as evident today as it was sixty years ago,
when the Warren Court decided Brown I, that the impact of attending
segregated schools will influence a student’s status in life in immeasurable ways.
In providing flexible latitude by which lower courts could apply
the Green factors when making unitary status determinations, the
179

180

181
182

183

Steven G. Rivkin, Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain, Teachers, Schools, and Academic
Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417, 449–50 (2005); Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd
& Jacob Vigdor, Who Teaches Whom? Race and the Distribution of Novice Teachers, 24 ECON.
EDUC. REV. 377, 377–78 (2005).
See Russell W. Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Segregation Still Matter? The Impact of
Student Composition on Academic Achievement in High School, 107 TCHRS. C. REC. 1999, 2020
(2005); Caroline Hoxby, Peer Effects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race
Variation 1, 35–36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7867, 2000),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7867 (finding that the average socioeconomic
level of students’ schools had as much impact on their achievement growth as their own
socioeconomic status). See James Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational
Opportunity, 38 HARV. EDUC. REV. 7, 9 (1968) (discussing the impact on class structures on
access to educational opportunity)
See GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 233–34 (1996).
See ROBERT BALFANZ & NETTIE LEGTERS, LOCATING THE DROPOUT CRISIS: WHICH HIGH
SCHOOLS PRODUCE THE NATION’S DROPOUTS? WHERE ARE THEY LOCATED? WHO ATTENDS
THEM? 23 (2004), available at http://www.csos.jhu.edu/crespar/techReports/Report70.
pdf.
See RUSSELL RUMBERGER, DROPPING OUT: WHY STUDENTS DROP OUT OF SCHOOL AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 77 (2011).
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Freeman Court contemplated these “quality of education” factors,
which can cause destructive outcomes for students if not regulated
184
properly.
[Q]uality of education was a legitimate inquiry in determining DCSS’
compliance with the desegregation decree, and the trial court found it
workable to consider the point in connection with its findings on resource allocation. . . [I]t underscores the school district’s record of
compliance in some areas but not others. The District Court’s approach
illustrates that the Green factors need not be a rigid framework. It illus185
trates also the uses of equitable discretion.

In consideration of the unitary status motions before the federal
judiciary since Parents Involved, it is evident that several judges chose
to exercise this flexibility in equitable discretion. For example, in Lee
v. Dothan City Board of Education, the court noted that the district’s elementary schools had achieved adequate yearly progress for two years
under No Child Left Behind Act when granting the motion for uni186
tary status. With respect to the Tucson Unified School District, the
court relied heavily upon the school district’s persistent achievement
gap data in determining that the district officials did not exhibit a
187
good faith commitment to the desegregation order. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals in this instance held that the district’s commitment
to address the issues in the future was not sufficient for a finding of
unitary status. Rather, the Court of Appeals insisted that the district
show how it would address the issues prior to the grant of the mo188
tion. In North Little Rock, Arkansas, the court granted only partial
unitary status to the district because of the lack of minority student
189
The court in Alaenrollment in Advanced Placement courses.
mance-Burlington County, North Carolina looked to a variety of factors when granting the unitary status motion, including student dis184

185
186
187
188
189

The District Court in Freeman examined the academic achievement of black students in
the district and achievement levels of black students on the SAT. See generally Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). Although the Court found no evidence of purposeful
discrimination as it related to achievement levels, the court denied the district unitary
status because it found that teachers in predominately black schools were overall less
educated and experienced than were teachers in white schools and per pupil expenditure
in predominately black schools was lower than in predominately-white schools. Id. at
483–84.
Id. at 492–93.
No. 70CV 1060-WHA, 2007 WL 1856928, at *3 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2007).
Fisher v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1164–65 (D. Ariz. 2008), rev’d sub nom.
Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).
Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2011).
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., No. 4:82cv00866 BSM, 2011 WL
1935332, at *26–27 (E.D. Ark. May 19, 2011) aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2011).
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cipline, minority participation in gifted and talented programs, stu190
dent achievement rates, and graduation rates of minority students.
In Anderson v. School Board of Madison County, the concurring opinion
took careful attention to note that the same harm of the current day
segregation that existed as the Court granted the district unitary sta191
tus was just as deleterious as it was when the litigation began.
This level of flexibility with respect to quality of education issues
allows district courts to ensure that motions for unitary status require
evidence that school districts address the educational needs of students to the greatest extent possible. As such, when designing desegregation programs, it is critical for district court judges to consider
programs that could remain in place once the school district is granted unitary status. If district courts were to require that school districts
create programs that specifically addressed issues of low graduation
rates among minority students in a school district, such programs
could be designed to properly pass constitutional muster after a unitary status determination.
Any court ordered program that solely classifies students on the
basis of race would not pass constitutional muster under strict scruti192
Facially race-neutral policies
ny upon release from court order.
could be implemented that assign students to particular programs
and schools based on academic need. Such a plan, on its face, would
neither use racial classification as a factor for student assignments nor
would it distribute any burdens or benefits on the basis of racial clas193
sification.
190
191

192

193

United States v. Alamance-Burlington Bd. of Educ., 640 F. Supp. 2d 670, 681–82
(M.D.N.C. 2009).
517 F.3d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he cruel irony is that racial isolation, albeit not as
the product of de jure segregation, largely remains as foreboding and potentially
deleterious as it was when federal court supervision began.”).
But see Vill. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977)
(holding that intentional discrimination can be shown when a facially race-neutral law or
policy applied evenhandedly is motivated by discriminatory intent and has a racially
discriminatory impact).
Such a plan would be distinguishable from the policies in prior Supreme Court equal
protection education cases in which the school districts or universities used racial
classifications as the sole factor, or a factor among many, to make determinations
regarding student school assignments or admissions to schools. See e.g., Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253–57 (2003) (examining a university admission policy based its
system on points given to applicants for multiple factors including points awarded to
applicants from underrepresented ethnic and racial groups); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (noting that a university admissions policy that admitted students
based on an evaluation of all the information in each student’s file, including an essay on
how the applicant would contribute to the school’s diversity, reaffirmed the school’s
commitment to diversity in an attempt to enroll a “critical mass” of underrepresented
minority students); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978)
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A school district’s use of the knowledge that minority students in
its district are not obtaining the optimal level of educational outcomes for future success (or even minimal level of knowledge to be
fully functioning) in fashioning educational programs that would address such remedial issues would not invalidate such a program post
unitary status. Equal protection law does not conflate knowledge or
awareness of race with racial classifications or racially discriminatory
194
purpose. A racial classification occurs only when an action “distrib195
utes burdens or benefits on the basis of” race. A racially discriminatory purpose would be evident if the school district adopted a policy
at least partially because the action would benefit or burden an iden196
Therefore, designing a school desegregation policy
tifiable group.
with racial factors in mind that would increase graduation rates would
not constitute a racial classification if the policy were facially raceneutral and administrated in a race-neutral fashion. The Supreme
Court has never held that strict scrutiny should be applied to a school
policy where race is not a factor merely because the school administrators were aware of or considered race when adopting the policy.
It is critical for the judiciary to understand the impact not only on
the lives of the children who are served in districts, but also on society
at large that will occur as a result of the granting of unitary status mo197
tions. Further, the actions that are approved by the court while the

194

195
196

197

(recognizing that the policy included a special admissions program that considered
applicants who self-identified as minority group members and admitted a prescribed
number of self-identified minority students each year).
See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995) (noting that the record contained
“evidence tending to show that the legislature was aware of the racial composition of [the
districts where the plaintiffs lived]”). The Court in Hays was also careful to note: “We
recognized in Shaw, however, that ‘the legislature always is aware of race when it draws
district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion,
and a variety of other demographic factors. That sort of race consciousness does not lead
inevitably to impermissible race discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 646 (1993)). It follows that proof of “[t]hat sort of race consciousness” in the
redistricting process is inadequate to establish injury in fact. Id. at 745–46.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose,’
however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It
implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”) (internal citation and footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Santamaria v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.3:06CV692-L, 2006 WL 3350194,
at *39 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006) (discussing that, in an attempt to curb white flight, a
school principal reserved certain classrooms for white students and assigned other
classrooms specifically for Latino and Black students, “in effect, operating, at taxpayer's
expense, a private school for Anglo children within a public school that was
predominantly minority”).
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district is under the court’s direction will have a permanent effect
and will be favored, even if they have a disparate impact on the most
198
vulnerable students.
The members of the federal judiciary are experienced in the application of the principles and precedents of equity; nevertheless, the
dismantling of desegregation efforts of public schools has proved to
199
In view of the
be without parallel or analogue in legal history.
unique nature of this social revolution, it is not surprising that desegregation cases have presented many problems that even sixty years of
evolving equitable remedies have not resolved.
Almost a decade after Brown I, Alabama Governor George Wallace, in his 1963 inaugural speech, pronounced these words:
Let us rise to the call of freedom-loving blood that is in us and send our
answer to the tyranny that clanks its chains upon the South. In the name
of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw a line in the
dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say: segrega200
tion now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.

CONCLUSION
Over a half a century later, we must ask ourselves, “was he being
defiant or prophetic?” The federal courts are now faced with the responsibility and honor to serve the American citizens in the legacy of
the federal judiciary that relied upon resourcefulness, experimentation, straining the traditional equitable powers, and expanding available remedies to overturn Plessy. It is evident that the legal transition
from segregation to integrated public education took over a century

198

199

200

See U.S. v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV. A. 70-15632, 2013 WL 4017093, at *9
(granting a motion for unitary status, court maintains that even though a particular
school is segregated it cannot be a vestige of de facto segregation because the school
opened under court’s supervision).
Consider the fact that the Kansas Supreme Court struck down segregated schools in 1881,
however, the Brown decision encompassed a review of Kansas’ segregated school systems
in 1954, seventy three years later. Further, sixty years after Brown I, in 2014, the Kansas
Supreme Court in 2014 maintained that Kansas maintained wealth based disparities
within the various districts of the State. See Bd. of Educ. Of City of Ottawa v. Tinnon, 26
Kan. 1, at *20 (1881) (holding that the school board cannot establish separate schools on
the basis of race.); Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1239 (Kan. 2014) (holding that the
State created unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities in violation of the State
Constitution).
See JODY CARLSON, GEORGE C. WALLACE AND THE POLITICS OF POWERLESSNESS: THE
WALLACE CAMPAIGNS FOR THE PRESIDENCY, 1964-1976 24 (Transaction Books, 1981); See
also Leon A. Higginbotham, Jr., Violence in America: Contracts, Myths and History, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 899, 904-905 (1994-1995) (describing the use of such outright defiance toward the
equality of minorities used as the rallying cry for equal justice advocates).
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to reconcile. However, the time is now for our judiciary to make the
legal truth of public school desegregation codified in Brown I a reality
for all children.
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APPENDIX A
Case
Citation

District/
State

Anderson v.
School
Board of
Madison
County, 517
F.3d 292 (5th
Cir., 2008)

Madison
County,
Mississippi

Unitary
Status
Granted/
Denied

Key details
regarding
unitary status
decision

Granted

US Government and
Plaintiffs objected
the motion on the
following grounds
(1) faculty assignment; (2) employment procedures;
(3) lack of racial
balance in the magnet program; (4)
facilities; (5) lack of
“good faith” by defendants because
they had not been in
compliance for a
reasonable amount
of time and because
they have not created an adequate program to attract white
students to the magnet program.

US
Objections
US government and
private plaintiffs opposed
the motion

Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?
No

Graduation
Rates
201186.4% 201
201088.1%
200984.4%
200889.5%

Court held (1) white
students are not
attracted to the
magnet program due
to cultural and geographic considerations; (2) the defendants have shown
“good faith” with
being in compliance
with consent decrees
throughout the
years; (3) district did
not show bad faith in
not reaching its goal
of ensuring that the
faculty within the
district is within a
15% range of the
district ration of
African American to
white teachers by not
forcing more experienced teachers to
transfer within the
district; (4) although
the baseball facilities
at the predominately
black school are not
as nice as those of
the other schools,
there is less interest
in the sport at the
identified school.

201

ALABAMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://www03.alsde.edu/accountability/preaccountability.asp (illustrating data obtained
from the Alabama Department of Education website) (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
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District/
State

Unitary
Status
Granted/
Denied

Key details
regarding
unitary status
decision
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US
Objections

Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

Graduation
Rates

Concurring opinion
by Judge Stewart
admitted that it is
undisputed that
racial isolation continues to occur in the
district for black
students; although
de jure segregation
exists, the racial
isolation that has
remained is just as
deleterious as when
federal court oversight began. Judge
Stewart warned of
the harms that will
occur when students
will no longer be
able to participate in
the majority to minority transfer program due to termination of court
supervision.
Lee v. Houston County
Board of
Education,
No. 1:70-CV1058, 2008
WL 166954
(M.D. Ala.
Jan. 16,
2008).

Houston
County,
Alabama

Granted

The court offered
very little dicta and
rather simply states
that the district has
shown good faith
compliance with all
of the court decrees
ordered and has
removed vestiges of
past discrimination.

None noted

No

201389% 202
2012- 87%
2011- 83%
201093.5%

Fisher, et al,
v. Tucson
Unified
School District, 549
F.Supp.2d
1132 (D.
Ariz., 2008)

Tucson,
Arizona

Granted
pending approval of post
unitary status
plan

The District Court
found that TUSD
failed to make the
most basic inquiries
necessary to assess
the ongoing effectiveness of its student
assignment plans,
and programs which
included race and
ethnic sensitive
school boundaries,
magnet programs,
open enrollment,
and providing an
equal education to
all students including those attending
all minority schools.
The court held that
TUSD ignored evidence and refused to
answer questions
regarding the effec-

None noted

No

201377.23% 203
201280.15%
201182.12%
201083.76%
200982.98%
200882.05%
200784.66%
200685.11%

202
203

Id.
TUSD STATS,
https://tusdstats.tusd1.org/paweb/aggD/graduation/gradrate.aspx (illustrating data
obtained from Tucson Unified School District website) (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
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US
Objections

Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

None noted

No

None noted

No

Graduation
Rates

tiveness of these
programs in order to
address demographic shifts in schools.

Fisher et. al,
v. Tucson,
Nos. CV 7490 TUC
DCB, CV 74204 TUC
DCB, 2011
WL
4102233,
(D. Ariz.,
Sept. 14,
2011).

Denied

The court found that
the district failed to
make a good faith
effort to combat the
demographic changes in the district and
exacerbated the
inequities of the
racial imbalance in
its failure to assess
programs. The court
reviewed much of
the achievement gap
data from the district
that demonstrated
persistent gaps in the
district. As such the
court held that the
district failed to
make good faith
effort to implement
changes required
under desegregation
agreement.
The court granted
the district unitary
status upon the
adoption of a postunitary status plan.
On remand from
the court of Appeals,
(Fisher v. Tucson, 652
th
F.3d 1131 (9 Cir,
2011), the Court of
Appeals held that
District Court erred
in granting unitary
status and held that
adoption of plan that
merely promised
future improvements
was not sufficient to
demonstrate past
good faith in this
instance. Upon remand, the District
Court held a special
master appointed to
develop a report on
how unitary status
might be achieved.

Castro, et
al., v. Phoenix Union
High
School, Nos.

204

Phoenix,
Arizona

Granted

The court granted
unitary status in 2005
over the other eighteen districts included in the original

Alahambr
a High
School 204
201269.98%

Graduation data were only available for these years and reported by individual schools.
ARIZONA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www.azed.gov/researchevaluation/graduation-rates/ (illustrating data obtained by the Arizona Department of
Education) (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
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82-302-PHXRCB, 851249-PHXRCB, 2008
WL 324229,
(D. Ariz.,
2008)
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District/
State

Unitary
Status
Granted/
Denied

Key details
regarding
unitary status
decision
suit, but maintained
limited oversight
over Phoenix Union
High School District
during construction
of new high school—
Betty Fairfax. Since
there was completion
to the high school
construction, the
court ordered an
end to the judicial
oversight.

US
Objections

[Vol. 17:3
Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

Graduation
Rates

201183.96%
Betty
Fairfax
High
School
201285.89%
201187.05%
Bostrom
Alternative Center
201255.81%
201152.24%

Camelback High
School
201277.75%
201176.18%
Carl Hayden High
School
201268.74%
201177.73%
Central
High
School
201274.27%
201175.17%
Cesar
Chavez
High
School
201282.86%
201181.63%
Franklin
Police/
Fire High
School
201298.15%
2011100%
Maryvale
High
School
201285.6%
201187.66%
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regarding
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US
Objections

671
Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

Graduation
Rates

MetroTec
h High
School
201282.86%
201186.17%

North
High
School
201280.29%
201181.58%
Phoenix
Union Bio
Science
2012100%
2011100%
South
Mountain
High
201270.8%
201179.56%
SunsDiamondbacks
Academy
201226.67%
201133.53%
Trevor
Browne
High
Academy
201276.61%
201178.79%
Smiley, et al,
v. Blevins, et
al., 626 F.
Supp.2d 659
(S.D.

205

206

Galveston,
Texas

Granted

In reviewing all of
the Green factors, the
court held that although the district
did not address the

Court notes
that DOJ did
not oppose
the motion
for unitary

No

201384.7% 205
201073% 206
2009- 73%

GALVESTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
http://www.gisd.org/education/page/download.php?fileinfo=MjAxM19HSVNEX0FjY29
1bnRhYmlsaXR5X1N1bW1hcnkucGRmOjo6L3d3dzUvc2Nob29scy90eC9nYWx2ZXN0b2
5pc2QvaW1hZ2VzL2RvY21nci9BTExmaWxlODA5Ny5wZGY=&sectiondetailid=30985 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2015).
Id.
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Case
Citation

District/
State

Unitary
Status
Granted/
Denied

TX, 2009)

United
States v.
Board of
Education
of the City
of Chicago,
663 F. Supp.
2d 649
(N.D. Ill.,
2009)

Chicago,
Illinois

Granted

Robinson, et
al, v. Shelby
County
Board of
Education,
566 F.3d
642, (6th
Cir., 2009)

Shelby
County,
Tennessee

Granted

207

208

Key details
regarding
unitary status
decision
issue of good faith
effort, they have
been in compliance
with court orders
throughout the
years—the district
met its racial percentage goal between 1978 and
1979, but was never
able to meet such
goals thereafter. Yet
complete racial balance is not required
to be granted a unitary motion
Court sated that US
never filed a complaint in the twentyeight year history of
the consent decree
in spite of the defendant’s annual
reports with the
court detailing their
remediation practices to satisfy the consent decree. In 2008,
the US filed a complaint alleging ELL
inadequacies in the
district. The court
maintained that they
lack jurisdiction over
ELL issues. The
court contended that
the school system
does not provide a
sufficient quality of
education as likely
necessary but held
the policies were
lawful nevertheless.
The lower district
court in this case
found that the district lacked unitary
status in student
assignment, faculty
and extracurricular
activities and granted
only partial unitary
status. The lower
court held that the
school district had
not reported any
desegregation data
for years, that only
10/44 schools were

US
Objections

[Vol. 17:3
Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

status.

Graduation
Rates
2008- 33%
2007- 52%

Yes

No

201365.4% 207
201261.2%
201158.3%
2003- 44%

No, joint
motion for
unitary status
by US, plaintiffs and defendants

No

201388% 208
2012- 88%
2011- 88%
2010- 91%

Data is not offered for any years between 2003 and 2011. CPS Students Set Record High
Graduation Rate of 65.4 Percent for School Year 2012-2013, CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Aug.
14, 2013), http://www.cps.edu/News/Press_releases/Pages/PR1_08_14_2013.aspx.
TENNESSEE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://www.tn.gov/education/research/dataavailablefordownload_000.shtml (last visited
Feb. 3, 2015).
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US
Objections

Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

Graduation
Rates

None noted

No

Little

integrated, and that
a lot of segregation
was due to zoning
laws and school
construction. The
lower court held the
district made very
little effort to integrate; faculty integration never really
occurred, and black
teacher hiring decreased over the
years. The district
never submitted any
docs about faculty
placement, nor did
the district submit
sufficient information to show how
students participated
in extracurricular
activities.
Court of Appeals
held that the ongoing racial unevenness
in student assignment did not further
subject the district to
the court’s equitable
powers. Court of
Appeals reversed the
decision of the district court and
granted full unitary
status.
Judge Marbley (dissenting) contended
that the plaintiffs—
in over 40 years of
the litigation—rarely
filed any opposition
against the district’s
plans. The dissent
explained that the
district court admitted that they had
been rubber stamping most of the motions during the forty
year history of the
case because no
information was ever
offered to show that
the plans offered
would have had a
negative impact on
desegregation plans.

Little Rock

Little Rock,

Unitary Status

Court of Appeals
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Unitary
Status
Granted/
Denied

Key details
regarding
unitary status
decision

Case
Citation

District/
State

School District et al, v.
North Little
Rock School
District et
al., v. Pulaski
County
Board of
Education et
al, 561 F. 3d
746 (8th
Cir., 2009)

Arkansas

granted for
Little Rock

affirmed the District
Court’s grant of
unitary status for
Little Rock Schools
and the finding that
the school district
acted in good faith
compliance with the
desegregation order.

Little Rock
School District et al, v.
North Little
Rock School
District et
al., v. Pulaski
County
Board of
Education et
al, No. 482cv00866BSM, 2011
WL
1935332,
(E.D. Ark.,
May 19,
2011)

North Little
Rock and
Pulaski
County,
Arkansas

Partial Unitary Status
Granted for
both districts

North Little Rock
and Pulaski granted
partial unitary status
in all respects. The
District Court admonished Pulaski
County for not increasing minority
enrollment in AP
course, and not
reporting in good
faith.

None noted

Little Rock
School District et al, v.
North Little
Rock School
District et
al., v. Pulaski
County
Board of
Education et
al, 664 F.3d
738 (8th
Cir., 2012)

North Little
Rock and
Pulaski
County,
Arkansas

The Court of Appeals granted unitary
status for North
Little Rock-holding that they
had good faith compliance even though
their teacher recruitment wasn't
satisfactory because
they provided sufficient evidence that
they attempted to
recruit from diverse
job fairs, and their
black teacher rates
exceeded that of the
labor market.

None noted

Full Unitary
Status for
North Little
Rock Granted; Partial
Unitary Status
for Pulaski
overturned

US
Objections

[Vol. 17:3
Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

Graduation
Rates
Rock
201375.35% 209
201281.78%
201165.7%
201078.5% 210
2009- 78
%
2008- 83%
2007- 74%
2006- 76%
North
Little
Rock201369.01% 211
201273.25%
201174.4%
Pulaski
District201372.89% 212
201265.65%
201160.8%

Court held Pulaski

209

210

211

212

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www.arkansased.org/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2015).
Great Ideas for Great Public Schools: Arkansas, Union Perceived as a Force For ‘Positive Change,’
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (Sept. 2009),
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/111012-arkansas.pdf; Barbara Moldauer, Stories of
Closing Achievement Gaps Through Community Engagement, NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION (Sept. 2009), http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/PEPSuccessStories.pdf.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www.arkansased.org/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2015).
Id.
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US
Objections

675
Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

Graduation
Rates

district did not make
a good faith effort
with compliance
because they did not
comply with the
reporting mechanisms requested .
Court held they
merely showed evidence that their stats
looked better than
other districts that
were declared unitary.
United
States v.
AlamanceBurlington
Board of
Education,
et al., 640
F.Supp. 2d
670 (M.D.
N.C., 2009)

AlamanceBurlington
Board of
Education,
North Carolina

Granted

Monroe, et
al, v. Jackson-Madison
County
School System, C.A.
No. 72-1327,
2010 WL
3732015
(W.D. Tenn,
Sept. 24,
2010)

Monroe and
Jackson
Counties,
Tennessee

Granted with
prejudice

213

214

215

Despite the joint
motion filed, the
district court ordered supplemental
information with
respect to the district
including racial
school disciplinary
rates; rates of participation in gifted and
talented programs,
and racial disparities
in achievement and
graduation rates.
The court held in
spite of the continued existence of
racially identifiable
schools, the district
showed good faith
and vestiges of de
jure segregation
were eliminated.
The sole issue before
the court was student
assignment because
all other Green factors had been previously satisfied. Since
2001, the number of
non-racially identifiable schools increased; the court
held this is not evidence of de jure
segregation. The
court cited to demographic changes that
indicated that that
district was once 60%
white and was now
40% white. The
court maintained
that the demograph-

No; Joint
motion by US
government
and the district for unitary status

No

201378.6% 213
201275.4%
201175.5%
201072.8%
200970.6%
200862.5%
200771.7%
200666.71%

No

Graduation Rate
Jackson- 214
2012- 90%
201188.9%
201087.4%
200986.4%
200892.4%
200788.3%
Dropout
Data Jackson- 215
20124.2%
2011- .8%

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://accrpt.ncpublicschools.org/app/2006/cgr/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://edu.reportcard.state.tn.us/pls/apex/f?p=200:50:4127973740266296::NO (last
Feb. 3, 2015).
Id.
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ic change was so
great that the increases in segregation rates were due
to demographic
shifts not de jure
segregation. The
court held that issues
such as student
achievement and
quality of schools
were not legal matters, rather issues of
local accountability.

Graduation
Rates
2010- .6%
20093.2%
20082.3%
20071.3%
Graduation Rate –
Madison 216
201295.1%
201191.6%
201091.5%
200983.8%
200881.7%
200781.8%
Dropout
Data –
217
Madison
20124.3%
20111.3%
20102.5%
20091.9%
20082.0%
20073.1%

Williams et
al., v. Kimbrough, et
al., No. 6511329, 2010
WL
1790516,
(W.D. La,
May 3,
2010)

Madison
Parish, Louisiana

Granted

The court held the
district was 93%
black and the school
demographics were
such that all schools
have predominately
black enrollment.
The court held that
nevertheless, the
district has complied
in good faith and
vestiges of de jure
segregation have
been eliminated.

No objections
by the US
Government,
plaintiffs or
the community

No

Graduation Rate218

201267.5%
201166.3%
201065.4%
200964.7%
200848.8%
Dropout
Rate- 219
20137.1%
20128.1%

216
217
218

219

Id.
Id.
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://www.louisianabelieves.com/resources/library/data-center (last visited Feb. 3,
2015).
Id.
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20117.4%
20107.0%
20096.4%
200810.3%

United
States v.
Caldwell
Parish
School
Board, No.
71-CV16751, 2011
WL
2634086,
(W.D. La,
July 5, 2011)

Caldwell
Parish
School,
Louisiana

Granted

District court reviewed Green factors
and concluded that
the district has eliminated all vestiges of
de jure segregation.

Court notes
that the US
filed no objections.

Yes, unitary status
review
initiated
by the
court

Graduation Rate220

201272.4%
201172.4%
201082.2%
200983.5%
200873.7%
Dropout
Rate - 221
2013<1.0%
2012<1.0%
2011<1.0%
2010<1.0%
2009<1.0%
20081.9%

Gray, et al.,
v. Lowndes
County
School District, 900 F.
Supp. 2d
703 (N.D.
Miss., 2012)

220
221
222

Lowndes
County,
Mississippi

Granted; case
dismissed with
prejudice

The remaining Green
factors under consideration for this
motion were facilities
and extracurricular
activities. The plaintiffs argued that
there were several
inequalities: unequal
baseball fields at the
schools; an unequal
entrance to school;
disparity in the passage rate for black
students (although
the district implemented an AP exam
process that increased the number

The Court
noted that the
US did not
oppose the
motion.

No

Graduation Data 222
201380.2%
201274.7%
201178.9%
201075.4%.

Id.
Id.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://reports.mde.k12.ms.us/report/report2009.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
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of black students
taking the exam, the
passage rate remained low for black
students); the continuation of the word
“confederate” as a
school nickname;
and the playing of
Dixie at school
events.
The court examined
the Green factors and
held student assignments were equalized; the baseball
field and entrance to
the school were
fixed; and that there
was evidence that
black students had
equal access to extracurricular activities. The court expressed concern over
the school nickname
and playing of Dixie
at school events,
however, maintained
that this did not
represent official
resistance to a unitary system or a
source of racial tension. The court relied on the good
nature of the superintendent and indicated that his "heart
is in the right place"
with the confederate
nickname.
Graham v.
Evangeline
Parish
School
Board, et al.,
No. 6511053, 2012
WL
1833400,
(W.D. La.,
May 16,
2012)

Evangeline
Parish, Louisiana

Granted

District court holds
that through reporting and concrete
efforts that good
faith compliance had
been shown. The
Court held there
were still some
schools that were
racially identifiable,
but court maintained
that this was a matter
of private choice.

Government
nor plaintiffs
file any objections to unitary status
motion.

No

Graduation Rates223

201267.3%
201166.8%
20105.3%
200956.9%
200866.8%
Dropout
Rates - 224
20125.4%

223

224

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://www.louisianabelieves.com/resources/library/data-center (last visited Feb. 3,
2015).
Id.

Feb. 2015]

Case
Citation

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT

District/
State

Unitary
Status
Granted/
Denied

Key details
regarding
unitary status
decision

US
Objections

679
Did
Court
order
status
update
of case?

Graduation
Rates
20112.2%
20104.4%
20097.2%
20086.6%

Taylor, et
al., v.
Ouachita
Parish
School
Board, et. al,
No-6612171, 2012
WL
4471643,
(W.D. La.,
Sept. 27,
2012)

Ouachita
Parish, Louisiana

Taylor, et
al., v.
Ouachita
Parish
School
Board, et. al,
No-6612171, 2013
WL
4094370,
(W.D. La.,
Aug. 13,
2013)
Thomas, et
al, v. St.
Martin Parish School
Board, et al.,
879 F.
Supp.2d 535
(W.D. La.,
2012)

225
226
227
228

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Partial unitary
status granted

Unitary Status
Granted;
Dismissed
with prejudice

St. Martin
Parish, Louisiana

Denied

District Court grants
partial unitary status
with respect to faculty and staff assignment, extracurricular activities
and physical facilities. The court held
that although the
numbers of faculty
and staff did not
meet target goals,
the district offered a
non-discriminatory
reason for its failure
to reach such goals.
The District Court
held that although
all of the schools
were still racially
identifiable, this
disparity was due to
geography and maintained that "aggressive" tactics such as
cross parish bussing
would be counterproductive to desegregation orders and
lead to more charter
schools.
In this instance, the
school district argued res judicata
indicating that they
were declared unitary in 1974 when a
judge called then
unitary. The NAACP
opposed saying that
they were still under
court order and
provided evidence
that indicated that
very little happened
after 1974 with respect to desegregation. The District
Court held that district is still under
court order.

The court
noted that
neither the
US Government nor the
plaintiffs
opposed the
motion for
unitary status.
None noted

District
Court
called for
a status
conference with
respect to
unitary
status

Graduation Data225

2012- 73%
201172.9%
201068.7%
200967.5%
2008- 65%
Dropout
Data- 226
20133.3%
20123.3%
2011-3.3%
20103.8%
20096.3%
20086.8%

None noted

Court
ordered a
status
conference on
status of
unitary
motion

Graduation Rate 227

201269.8%
201169.7%
201072.2%
200963.1%
200860.9%
Dropout
Data- 228
20134.0%
20124.0%
2011-
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3.3%
20105.3%
20096.8%
20086.3%

Andrews, et
al., v. City of
Monroe, et
al., No. 6511297, 2012
WL 2357310
(W.D. La,
June 20,
2012)

United
States v.
Morehouse
Parish
School
Board, et al.,
No. 6914429, 2013
WL 291578
(W.D. La.,
March 4,
2013)

City of Monroe, Louisiana

Morehouse
Parish, Louisiana

Partial unitary
status granted

Granted

Plaintiffs opposed
the motion indicating that the student
assignment plan left
the southern part of
the city just as segregated as it was in
1964. Court held the
segregation is not a
result of discriminatory intent—rather
residential housing
patterns. The plaintiffs argued that the
district had done a
good job of desegregating the northern
part of the city. The
court remarked that
plaintiffs had suggestions for integrating
the southern part of
the city, but merely
that the plans are
not feasible. Court
granted the motion
for partial unitary
status for student
assignment.
District Court held
unitary status found
in all areas including
student assignment
although the court
maintained that the
schools are not racially balanced. The
court held that
school assignments
were due to changing demographics
and residential housing patterns.

DOJ filed
motion to
oppose

No

Graduation Data229

201265.9%
201165.6%
201062.6%
200958.5%
200854.7%
Dropout
Data- 230
20134.0%
20128.4%
20115.7%
20106.9%
20096.6%
20087.9%
Court noted
that the US
filed no objection.

No

Graduation Rate 231

201261.7%
201161.0%
201055.4%
200951.1%
200852.7%
Dropout
Data- 232
20137.5%
20124.7%
20117.2%

229

230
231
232

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://www.louisianabelieves.com/resources/library/data-center (last visited Feb. 3,
2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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20107.9%
200912.1%
200813.4%

Randall, et
al., v. Sumter School
District, No3:63-CV1240, 2013
WL
3786344,
(D. S.C., July
18, 2013)

Sumter,
South Carolina

Granted

United
States v.
Franklin
Parish
School
Board, No.
70-15632,
2013 WL
4017093,
(W.D. La.,
Aug. 6,
2013)

Franklin
Parish, Louisiana

Granted;
dismissed with
prejudice

233

234

235

District Court held
that any racial imbalance in student assignment was from
white flight and
declining white enrollment, not vestiges
of discrimination.

None noted.
Joint motion
filed by plaintiffs and defendant for
unitary status.

No

Throughout the
course of the litigation, fourteen
amendments were
made over fortythree years and DOJ
never filed any motions or had any
objections until this
instant motion. DOJ
argued that three of
the elementary
schools were out of
compliance with
respect to faculty
assignments. DOJ
maintains that the
district can merely
assign newly hired
white teachers to
those schools. The
district maintained
that they make
teacher assignments
according to teacher
preference and they
feared that if they
assign teachers to
rural black schools,
the teachers will
leave. The court held
the racial faculty/student ratio was
set fifteen years ago
and the law doesn't
require strict compliance. The court
held that there is no
vestige of past dis-

DOJ opposed
the motion

Court sua
sponte
ordered
the United
States to
review the
case in
2009

Graduation Data233

201380.4%
201281.5%
201179.3%
201077.1%
200980.2%
Graduation Data234

201262.6%
201162.6%
201059.6%
200965.4%
200863.5%
Dropout
Data - 235
20135.5%
20125.4%
20114.6%
20107.1%
200910.9%
20087.2%

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://ed.sc.gov/data/reportcards/2009/district/s/D4317999.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2015)..
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
http://www.louisianabelieves.com/resources/library/data-center (last visited Feb. 3,
2015).
Id.
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